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Opportunistic behavior is often studied in interfirm relationships, yet we don’t 
know the different types of behavior that are hidden behind the general opportunism 
label. Therefore, using game theory as guidance, this dissertation examines the roots of 
and influences on two types of opportunistic behaviors in strategic alliances. 
Specifically, the author suggests that the strategic alliances literature would benefit from 
recognizing that opportunistic behaviors don’t always originate from the firm (rogue-firm 
opportunism), but instead often originate from individual alliance employees (deviant-
personal opportunism). Moreover, this dissertation examines how relational factors 
between two alliance partners impact these two types of opportunistic behaviors. The 
relational factors considered in this dissertation are trust, monitoring, and relative 
alliance identity.  
Hypotheses presented in this dissertation are tested across two studies. The first 
study utilizes a behavioral business simulation. It combines survey data collection with 
objective performance data obtained from the simulation. The second study investigates 
the hypothesized relationships in a cross-sectional sample of strategic alliance 
executives. It primarily replies on survey data collection, but also introduces secondary 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
 
 
Rogue-Firm Versus Deviant-Personal Opportunistic Behavior  
 
The often observed tension between cooperation and competition in strategic 
alliances pulls partner firms to behave opportunistically (Li, Boulding, and Staelin 2010; 
Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Opportunistic behavior has been originally defined as 
“self-interest seeking with guile,” (Williamson 1979, p. 6) where guile often is 
represented by devious, cunning, sneaky, deceitful, and sometimes outright cheating 
alliance partner behavior. Opportunistic behavior poses a real threat to strategic 
alliances because an inability to effectively prevent opportunistic behavior causes 
alliances to fail. While there are various reasons why alliances may fail, the academic 
literature suggests that out of the reported 50% to 80% failure rates of strategic 
alliances, a significant portion can be attributed to opportunistic behavior (Cui 2013; 
Greve et al. 2010; Kogut 1989; Noordhoff et al. 2011).  
 Past research in strategic alliances focused on general opportunistic behavior at 
partner firm-level only. Wathne and Heide (2000) argue that we must understand 
various types of opportunistic behaviors before we can explain properly the high failure 
rates. Their conceptual review of the construct is one of only a few reviews that attempt 
to build a typology of opportunistic behavior (discussed in detail in Chapter 2). However, 
none of the existing conceptual typologies differentiate between firm-level and 
individual-level opportunistic behavior. The popular press offers plentiful examples of 
opportunism at the individual level in interorganizational relationships. Yet, no attention 




alliances. The individual-level opportunistic behavior is termed here as deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior, and it is defined as an individual alliance employee’s self-interest 
seeking through devious means that threatens the well-being of an alliance, its 
members, or both. The firm-level opportunistic behavior is termed here as rogue-firm 
opportunistic behavior; and its definition remains consistent with existing literature. 
Rogue-firm opportunistic behavior is defined here as an alliance partner-firm’s own self-
interest seeking and violations of expected norms of behavior at the expense of another 
alliance partner – adapted from Jayachandran et al. (2013).  
 A majority of the studies on strategic alliances and exchange relationships in 
general utilize transaction cost economics (TCE) theory to explain opportunistic 
behavior. TCE implicitly treats opportunism as a firm-level phenomenon (Wathne and 
Heide 2000); hence, the lack of focus on deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. New 
theoretical perspectives must be considered to bring to light the presence of deviant-
personal opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, this dissertation draws on game theory, a 
theory that is capable of explaining both rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic 
behaviors. More on game theory is offered later in this chapter and in Chapter 2.  
As a consequence of the dominant presence of TCE, the academic literature 
offers countless examples of rogue-firm opportunistic behavior (Anderson et al. 2013) 
but lacks examples of deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Table 1 offers some 
representative examples of rogue-firm opportunism. This research myopia has created 
a gap in the literature. The gap is the lack of focus on deviant-personal opportunistic 
behavior and relational factors that can effectively prevent, minimize, or at least detect 




mostly from popular press, are presented in Table 2. One of the most telling examples 
is that of the “Lopez Saga.” Mr. Lopez was indicted by a Detroit grand jury on charges 
including fraud and transportation of stolen documents that damaged his employer, 
General Motors, and the perception of GM in the eyes of its strategic partners. 
BusinessWeek offers a summary of the saga.  
During his nine month control of General Motors’ purchasing department, Mr. 
Lopez, in an attempt to slash $4 billion from the carmaker’s parts bill, was 
accused of employing a range of questionable strategies. Strategic suppliers 
alleged that Lopez exaggerated rivals’ bids to compel them to bid lower still. … 
[In addition to] his rush to cut costs, Lopez leaked suppliers’ proprietary 
information to the competition. (Kelly and Kerwin 1992)  
 Many more examples of deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors exist. Many 
come from the pharmaceutical industry, an often studied industry because of its heavy 
use of strategic alliance partnerships. In addition to the two examples offered in Table 2, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Abbott Laboratories, Johnson & Johnson, K.V. Pharmaceutical, and 
Synthes were, in recent history, all charged with a variety of behavioral misconduct 
originating from various management levels (Thomas and Schmidt 2012). The 
behavioral misconduct is often initiated by single manager or a small deviant group of 
two or three managers whose misbehaviors were not sanctioned by the firm. These are 
all major companies in the industry and are regularly creating strategic alliances with 






Table 1. Examples of Rogue-Firm Opportunistic Behavior 
 
Source Opportunistic Behavior 
  
Dutta, Bergen, and John 1994* Manufacturer-reseller relationships: Resellers violating 
explicit resale agreements. 
 
Wilkie, Mela, and Gundlach 
1998* 
Suppliers providing an alluring but insincere offer to 
sell a product or service they do not intend or want to 
sell.  
 
Murry and Heide 1998* Manufacturer-retailer relationships: Retailers receiving 
a priori allowances for displaying promotional materials 
without following through on the original agreement.  
 
Lee 1998 Exporter-importer relationships: Exporters sometimes 
intentionally lie to importers in order to make the 
transaction. 
 
Achrol and Gundlach 1999 Vertically arranged relationships: breaching formal and 
informal agreement.  
 
Jap and Anderson 2003 Supplier-buyer relationships: making false 
accusations, failure to provide proper notification, not 
doing as promised. 
 
Anderson and Jap 2005 Supplier-customer relationships: Supplier cutting 
corners by applying 2 instead of 3 coats on auto parts 
without telling the customer.  
  









Table 2. Examples of Deviant-Personal Opportunistic Behavior 
 
Source Opportunistic Behavior 
  
Phillips 1982* Salespeople exaggerating expenditure reports. 
 
Kelly and Kerwin 1992* Mr. Lopez single-handedly exaggerating the bids from 
rival suppliers to obtain lower bids and leaking 
information to competition. 
 
Lyons, Krachenberg, and 
Henke 1990 
Corporate-level cooperative relationships 
systematically undermined by individual purchasing 
agents across automotive firms treating suppliers in an 
opportunistic fashion.  
 
Healy and Palepu 2003 Mr. Skilling, Mr. Fastow, and Mr. Lay keeping losses 
from JEDI joint venture with CalPERS off of Enron’s 
books by creating Chewco L.P. Ultimately these 
practices led to Enron’s bankruptcy, also affecting its 
partner firms.  
 
Dash 2004 Brystol-Myers Squibb executives pressuring 
wholesalers to buy substantial amounts of 
pharmaceuticals ahead of anticipated demand in order 
to look attractive in front of business partners of 
current and future joint ventures.  
  
SEC 2003 Four executives of Nicor Energy LLC (a joint venture) 
inflating net income by $11 million. Consequently, 
parent companies of the alliance experienced 
unexpected transaction costs.  
 
Koleva 2012 “Protocol 007” scandal: MERCK’s lab supervisor was 
caught manually changing test results for MMR-II 
vaccine in order to deliver on its business partner’s 
specifications. The business partner was the US 
government.  
 





Since opportunistic behavior is often the central construct of interest in strategic 
alliances, the research agenda in marketing and management focuses on explaining 
and minimizing the risk of opportunism. Therefore, the research focus is predominantly 
on either control mechanisms or relational factors that help with discouraging and 
capturing opportunistic behavior (e.g., Sartor and Beamish 2014; Xu, Fenik, and Shaner 
2014). The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate relational factors that 
can effectively explain both rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. To 
date, the vast majority of research has focused on control mechanisms (economic 
perspective) or relational factors (social exchange theory perspective) in isolation when 
attempting to understand opportunism. The key argument here is that instead of 
focusing on one perspective or one factor, it is fruitful to theory and practice to look at 
how these factors work together, which factors are dominant preventers of opportunism, 
how some of the factors interact, and ultimately how they impact behavior of alliance 
partners. Recent research calls align well with this argument (Heide, Wathne, and 
Rokkan 2007; Santos and Eisenhardt 2005).  
A Game Theoretical Perspective 
 
 The latest advancements in game theory successfully bring the rational 
economic perspective together with the more sociological perspective. Gintis (2009) 
notes: 
The various behavioral disciplines (economics, psychology, sociology, politics, 
anthropology, and biology) are currently based on distinct principles and rely on 
distinct types of data. However, game theory fosters a unified framework 




information exchange that may eventually culminate in a degree of unity within 
the behavioral sciences now enjoyed only by the natural sciences. (p. 48)  
 Therefore, game theory is used as the guiding theory for this dissertation. Game 
theory helps us to explain the behavior of individuals or groups (i.e., alliance employees 
or alliance partner-firms) whose outcomes depend on the behavior of others in a 
strategic interaction. Moreover, game theory is helpful to predict how various factors of 
the strategic interaction will influence the behaviors of these individuals or groups 
(Axelrod 2006; Chen and Chen 2011; Cox 2004; Uzea and Fulton 2009). 
 Game theory has come a long way from single-shot (i.e., one round) prisoner’s 
dilemma games and Nash equilibrium. Game theory addresses the behavior of two 
parties in a so-called “mixed-motive social dilemma” (Dawes 1980). This dilemma exists 
in strategic alliances at the firm- and individual-level, because “parties often have 
motives to both cooperate and compete with each other, to maximize the collective 
interest yet also maximize their self-interest at the expense of the collective interest” 
(Ferrin, Bligh, and Kohles 2007, p. 468). Therefore, game theory researchers focus on 
studying factors that can influence levels of opportunistic behavior between two or more 
parties. Various game types have been investigated (e.g., single- vs multiple-shot 
games, full- vs partial-information available, trust games, prisoner’s dilemma, ultimatum 
game, social goods game, tit-for-tat, and many others), but the most applicable game to 
strategic alliances is the prisoner’s dilemma game (Parkhe 1993). Experimental 
economists playing out the prisoner’s dilemma game investigate how monitoring 
(Axelrod 2006), trust (Cox 2004), and social identity (Chen and Chen 2011), among 




prisoner’s dilemma application of game theory is very suitable to help explain how these 
factors affect rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunism in strategic alliances.  While 
this dissertation draws on other theories (transaction cost economics, social exchange 
theory, and social identity theory), game theory provides a foundation for all the 
theoretical lenses used in this dissertation. 
Research Questions 
 
 The main objective of this study is twofold. First, I seek to build on and to 
enhance existing knowledge of opportunistic behavior in strategic alliances. Based on 
business press examples and some exploratory field interviews, the objective is to 
differentiate between rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Despite 
evidence from popular press that deviant-personal opportunism is a problem, the 
academic literature in strategic alliances does not recognize this phenomenon. To 
address this phenomenon, it is imperative to consider other theoretical views than TCE, 
because TCE’s focus on firm-level analysis offers at best a limited explanation of 
deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Game theory (GT) and its incorporation of the 
social identity theory (SIT), social exchange theory (SET), and transaction cost 
economics (TCE) are used as the conceptual perspectives to explain both rogue-firm 
and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Second, this study introduces relative 
alliance identity as a relational factor that is expected to impact deviant-personal and 
rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors above and beyond other relational factors explored 
here; specifically, partner monitoring and trust. Moreover, the game theory suggests 
that the interaction between trust and monitoring explains and predicts opportunism 




this study is: What are the roots of and influences on rogue-firm and deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors in strategic alliances?  Within this overall research question, the 
more specific sub-questions came to surface: 
1) Which of the studied (relative alliance identity, monitoring, and trust) relational 
factors is most effective at minimizing rogue-firm opportunistic behavior, and 
which is most effective at minimizing deviant-personal opportunistic behavior?  
2) Do trust and monitoring factors exhibit a supplementary (additive) or 
complementary (interactive) role in explaining the two types of opportunism?  
3) Do contextual considerations, such as stable relationship conditions, affect these 
relational factors differently?  
4) Does rogue-firm opportunistic behavior affect alliance outcomes differently from 
deviant-personal opportunistic behavior? 
Contributions 
 
 This study contributes to marketing knowledge in several areas. First, marketing 
literature has not explicitly addressed rogue-firm versus deviant-personal opportunistic 
behavior in business-to-business relationships, such as strategic alliances. This new 
conceptualization is likely to refresh our perspective on opportunistic behavior and, 
consequently, improve exchange relationship theories. Second, marketing literature 
thus far has mostly utilized TCE, SET, and commitment-trust theory. While these 
theories greatly contribute to knowledge in marketing, they are not sufficient to explain 
deviant-personal opportunism and all the factors studied here. Game theory and its 
incorporation of TCE, SET, and SIT theories brings in a fresh perspective on 




monitoring and its effect on the two types of opportunism.  Third, social identity theory 
has been primarily applied at the individual level within a single organization, but it has 
not been considered in strategic alliances where individuals and firms have to cooperate 
while also competing. Game theory addresses identity issues within a mixed-motive 
social dilemma setting that is present in strategic alliances. Moreover, the use of game 
theory as the overarching and foundational theory for the three factors and their 
respective theories (i.e., monitoring and TCE, trust and SET, relative alliance identity 
and SIT) for the purposes of studying rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic 
behavior will improve our knowledge of strategic alliances.       
 This study also contributes to marketing practice. First, understanding which 
relational mechanisms reduce rogue-firm and which reduce deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior can offer potential cost savings for alliance partner-firms through 
an establishment of more efficient relational systems. Second, finding what role a 
relative alliance identity plays in minimizing opportunistic behavior is managerially 
important because managers need to know how much effort should be put into building 
a sense of identity among alliance partners. Third, the need to monitor and to build trust 
is a relatively well established practice in corporate world; however, how these two 
interact and to what extent managers should invest in one, the other, or both 
simultaneously is of interest to managers. In summary, helping managers realize the 
optimal investments in a mix of relational factors can help them engage more effectively 








 Studies examining strategic alliances utilize several streams of literature, but 
always in isolation. While isolated literature streams have yielded powerful insights, 
such isolated perspectives also have limited external validity and have constrained the 
academic conversation about the studied phenomenon (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005). 
Therefore, one of the objectives of this research is to use game theory to integrate 
distinct literatures in order to explain exchange relationships within the context of 
strategic alliances. I utilize game theory in this dissertation because it is a foundational 
theory for the streams of literature relevant to the relational factors studied here. Game 
theory brings together three perspectives and their key constructs that influence 
relational behaviors. Together, these key constructs impact rogue-firm and deviant-
personal opportunistic behavior. Specifically, game theory ties together monitoring of 
alliance partner (TCE), relative alliance identity (SIT), and trust in the alliance partner 
(SET). The three relational factors and their impact on opportunistic behavior and 
outcomes are depicted in the conceptual model of this dissertation presented in Figure 
1.  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) draws on a game theory-based argument 
which suggests that monitoring of alliance partners should aid in suppressing 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985). Under certain assumptions, game theory 
suggests that monitoring creates a game where full information is available to all 
participants, thus dwarfing opportunism. In other words, monitoring eliminates, at least 










While “monitoring programs are integral part of many firms’ relationship 
strategies” (Ghosh and John 1999), strategic alliance studies do not directly discuss and 
empirically test monitoring mechanisms. In arm’s length B2B relationships literature, 
Heide et al. (2007, p. 426) support this claim by stating that “…the monitoring 
phenomenon remains poorly documented” in interfirm relationships. Narayandas and 
Rangan (2004, p. 75) note that “a worthwhile area for research is to identify whether 
and when performance evaluation based on outcomes [outcome-based monitoring] or 




relationship.” Calls to enhance the theory of monitoring remain mostly unanswered 
(Jensen 1998). 
Relative Alliance Identity 
 
 According to game theory, low group identity leads to an inefficient equilibrium 
solution in a minimum effort game (Chen and Chen 2011), and in a repeated-play public 
goods game a team identity limits shirking and free-riding behavior (Eckel and 
Grossman 2005). This incorporation of social identity into game theory can offer a fresh 
take on a range of phenomena in organizational studies. “The turn to identity could be 
regarded as a source of revitalization for existing research areas, novel in that it 
continues establishing lines of inquiry by different means” (Alvesson, Ashcraft, and 
Thomas 2008, p. 6). It is argued in this dissertation that assessing to what degree 
individual employees of an alliance identify with the alliance as opposed to their 
respective alliance partner firms can help us better understand the complexity of the 
largely unexplored (Wathne and Heide 2000) phenomenon of interest – opportunistic 
behavior.   
 Social identity theory is based on the minimal group paradigm, also known as the 
psychological group (Tajfel 1982). The main argument of the theory states that 
members of the in-group do not even have to explicitly interact with other in-group 
members to exhibit favorable behavior towards in-group members and unfavorable 
behavior towards out-group members (Tajfel and Turner 1979).  
 Extension of the psychological group suggests that the out-group does not have 
to explicitly exist. The out-group only needs to be ingrained in the psyche of the in-group 




the in-group members will start to behave favorably towards other in-group members. 
An isomorphic argument in strategic alliances would suggest that if the alliance 
management can create a sense of threat from other competitors in the market, it can 
consequently create a sense of psychological in-group among alliance employees. The 
competitors do not necessarily have to be explicitly described beyond the fact that they 
pose a threat to the livelihood of the alliance and its partners. This argument is 
supported by Santos and Eisenhardt (2005), who state that “identity can be a source of 
competitive strength by distinguishing the organization from potential competitors.” The 
word potential is key in their statement. A competitor (i.e., an out-group) does not 
necessarily have to explicitly exist at the moment. Thus, competitive intensity in the 
market and market uncertainty, together also known as environmental dynamism (Miles, 
Covin, and Heeley 2000; Sarkar, Echambadi, and Harrison 2001) can have an impact 
on relative alliance identity.  In this case, the environmental dynamism makes the in-
group more salient to members of the group. In prisoner’s dilemma and battle-of-the 
sexes games, Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) support the notion that when 
groups are more salient, group membership significantly affects individual behavior. 
While the interest in this dissertation is to explore relational and not environmental 
factors, due to the above reasons, it is necessary to at least control for environmental 
dynamism. Furthermore, environmental dynamism has been shown to affect other 
relational factors as well as opportunistic and cooperative behaviors (Jansen, Vera, and 
Crossan 2009; Joshi and Campbell 2003).    
 “Identity offers an alternative to more rigid and suboptimal control strategies like 




2008). In other words, building an argument for an opportunistic behavior based on the 
relative alliance identity rather than monitoring of alliance partners is likely to offer a 
superior predictive and explanatory power. This argument is supported by Santos and 
Eisenhardt (2005), who conceptually argue that “identity often dominates efficiency 
[TCE perspective] considerations” when it comes to organizational boundaries. It is 
argued here that alliances that are able to reshape the boundaries of their partners such 
that the bordering partner boundary weakens while the outer boundary of the alliance 
strengthens will experience decreased level of both rogue-firm and deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior. From game theory point of view, such reshaping of a boundary 
creates “identity costs” (Uzea and Fulton 2009) which hurt parties that choose to defect 
(i.e., be opportunistic) in the prisoner’s dilemma game (i.e., the alliance).  
 Some may see relationship marketing literature as synonymous with social 
identity literature. While the majority of scholars have come to the conclusion that the 
two in fact offer distinct perspectives on organizational studies, it is useful to address 
the concern. Identification with a group can exist even in the absence of interpersonal 
cohesion, similarity, or interaction. The absence of the relational factors (e.g., trust) 
does not change the fact that social identification (e.g., relative alliance identity) impacts 
affect and behavior. A series of laboratory experiments proved that in-group favoritism 
occurs even without interaction with in-group members or with other out-groups (Tajfel 
1982). Explicit random assignment of participants into groups leads to discrimination 
against out-groups and enhanced cooperation between members of an in-group 
(Locksley, Ortiz, and Hepburn 1980). Social identity is a psychological phenomenon. 




relationships with its members” (Ashforth and Mael 1989). Ultimately, relational factors 
such as trust don’t have to be present to have an identity.  
 SIT has been initially conceptualized at the individual level (Tajfel and Turner 
1979). Thus, the relative alliance identity mechanism is expected here to perform best 
against deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. However, in more recent literature, 
arguments are being made for a group level of analysis (Ashmore, Deaux, and 
McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). Therefore, it is expected that relative alliance identity will also 
influence rogue-firm opportunistic behavior.  
Trust 
 
 From the game theory perspective, trust “facilitates cooperation because a party 
who believes the partner is trustworthy will develop a higher willingness to risk, and 
therefore in conditions of risk, the party is more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior” 
(Ferrin, Bligh, and Kohles 2007, p. 474). In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the riskier but 
more profitable option is for parties to cooperate. With trust, one is more likely to 
engage in the riskier proposition due to the belief that the other party will choose to 
cooperate. This basic idea is also reflected in social exchange theory, where trust is an 
important relational mechanism that encourages future exchange in a relationship 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994). The definitions of trust vary across studies. However, at the 
core of each definition is the belief that the other party in a relationship will do as 
promised. Therefore, trust is defined here as the perceived credibility that the alliance 
partner will behave in the best interest of the exchange relationship.  
 Trust as an antecedent to relational behaviors has consistently been found to be 




However, its effect on relational behaviors proves to be a two-sided coin. One side of 
the coin suggests that when trust is established between business partners, 
commitment levels rise (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Trust in B2B relationships has been 
shown to lead to lower levels of opportunistic behaviors (Rindfleisch and Moorman 
2001). As a result of lower opportunistic behaviors, partners are less hesitant to make 
financial and knowledge idiosyncratic investments (Noordhoff et al. 2011). These 
investments in turn offer higher chances of a healthy collaborative relationship between 
partners.  
 On the other side of the coin, scholars have shown that in highly trusted 
relationships, partners stop challenging each other’s thinking because their way of 
thinking merges. Because it is impolite to challenge a “friend” (Anderson and Jap 2005), 
partners fail to switch to new partners when they should (Gu, Hung, and Tse 2008), and 
partners have a better chance of getting away with opportunistic behavior (Selnes and 
Sallis 2003). This view is supported by Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002), who caution that 
empirical evidence does not support the positive relationship between trust and 
performance and caution that “trust may be in danger of being oversold and 
inappropriately used in practice.”  
 These conflicting views have received more attention in recent literature. For 
example, Noordhoff et al. (2011) show that embedded ties between supplier and 
customer firms have both bright and dark sides that influence supplier innovation. 
Similarly, Anderson and Jap (2005) argue that “[t]he very factors [trusted & close 
relationships] that make partnerships with customers or suppliers beneficial can leave 




example. A supplier of auto parts developed a very close relationship with its automaker 
customer. They built trust with the customer by encouraging its employees to go to 
dinners, play football, and go to other social events with employees from the automaker 
firm. Once the trust was established, the purchasing department eased up on its total 
quality management practices. As a result, the supplier started to cut its production 
costs by eliminating one of three coats of paint. The cost savings were not shared with 
the customer. “In this manner, the trust, social relationships and investments that were 
developed to make the relationship successful became the doorway to the dark side” 
(Anderson and Jap 2005, p. 77). 
 This discussion illustrates the strengths and the weaknesses of purely trust-
based relationships. Moreover, existing studies focus on organizational level of analysis 
only and, therefore, do not explicitly investigate the existence of deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior. Thus, it is imperative to push research to explore other factors 
and theoretical perspectives that can together better explain and predict rogue-firm and 
deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. 
Alliance Partner Stability 
 
 Game theory suggests that any factors that can destabilize a strategic 
relationship will negatively impact relational factors between strategic partners and 
consequently increase the chances of opportunistic behavior (Parkhe 1993). In strategic 
alliances, such destabilizing factors can originate from internal sources since there are 
at least two partners to an alliance among which competition or sources of uncertainties 




alliances, then there is a stronger sense of internal competitive intensity than in the case 
of vertical alliances (Luo, Rindfleisch, and Tse 2007).  
Differences in national and organizational cultures between alliance partners can 
also act as a destabilizing force in a strategic relationship. “The underlying values and 
attitudes of different cultural groups can influence the behavior of those groups, as well 
as the nature of decisions they make” (Hewett and Bearden 2001).  Empirical studies 
exist linking cultural distance (Hofstede 1980) to level of cooperativeness among two 
parties from different national cultures (Chatman and Barsade 1995; Li et al. 2010; 
Williams, Han, and Qualls 1998).  
Another potentially destabilizing factor is the degree to which an alliance partner 
is dependent on the other. If one party depends on another, the dependent party tends 
to lose its autonomy and power to decide for itself (Geyskens et al. 1996). Such a loss 
of autonomy can result in distrust, less identification with the power-wielding partner, 
and implementation of more robust monitoring mechanisms. Also, the power-wielding 
partner may see an opportunity to act opportunistically against a partner whose 
defenses are weakened due to being dependent on the partner. Therefore, it is argued 
in this dissertation that stable partner conditions, such as partner independence, 
cooperation rather than competition among partners, and organizational culture 
proximity will positively impact relational factors between two partners. 
Method Overview 
 
 This dissertation carried out two studies using diverse settings and data 
collections to assure a rigorous understanding of relational factors in strategic alliances 




First, relevant academic literature in marketing and other disciplines was reviewed.  The 
literature review was supplemented with qualitative fieldwork data in an effort to arrive at 
a conceptually sound and practically grounded model. Then, the conceptual model and 
its hypotheses were tested using two studies. In the first study, the model and the 
hypotheses were tested using a multi-period business simulation. Laboratory simulation 
techniques have been used extensively in the behavioral sciences to provide an 
analogy to a variety of social phenomena often related to the business world (Gundlach, 
Achrol, and Mentzer 1995). The simulation was a suitable environment to study 
exchange relationships directly in a laboratory-like setting. The analysis of the 
conceptual model presented in this dissertation benefited from such laboratory 
conditions. In the second study, a sample of relevant strategic alliances was obtained 
along with some variables of interest from SDC Platinum database of strategic 
alliances. Key informants from firms within this sample were approached to participate 
in a large-scale, survey-based study. First, the measurement model was examined to 
ascertain psychometrically sound measures for both studies. Then, the hierarchical 
linear regression was used for analysis. 
Organization of Dissertation 
 
 The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers a 
detailed literature review of related theories and phenomena from marketing and other 
fields. Hypotheses are offered in this chapter as well. The next chapter, Chapter 3, 
describes two studies and their respective research methodologies used to test the 
conceptual model. Chapter 4 presents the analysis and findings of the two studies. 






























CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
        
  
Strategic Alliances and Marketing 
 
 The exchange function is recognized as the primary function of marketing 
(Maclaran 2009). The examination of antecedents and consequences of various types 
of exchange relationships is arguably the primary area of research inquiry in marketing 
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). One place where these 
exchange relationships present themselves is in strategic alliances. Strategic alliances 
play a vital role in today’s global marketplace and thus are a key element of marketing 
strategy (Fang et al. 2008). Definitions of strategic alliances are diverse across the 
academic literature.  Similarly, among practitioners, a regional chapter representative of 
the Association of Strategic Alliances Professionals (ASAP) stated in one of the 
fieldwork interviews that ASAP’s ongoing struggle is to offer a unifying definition of the 
term strategic alliance. Representative definitions from across the academic literature 
are presented in Table 3. The common thread across these definitions is part of the 
definition used here. In this dissertation, strategic alliances are defined as collaborative 
exchange relationships between two or more firms to gain a competitive advantage from 
joint efforts, risk sharing, and meeting complex market demands.  
 When effective, strategic alliances can produce a variety of marketing benefits to 
partner firms. New product development, marketing initiatives, customer orientation, 
competitor orientation, and financial performance are just a few examples of marketing 
phenomena well represented in the strategic alliances research. An example of each of 




Table 3. Definitions of Strategic Alliances 
 






Any independently initiated interfirm 
link that involves exchange, sharing, 
or co-development.  
 





arrangements among two or more 
organizations to jointly acquire and 
utilize information and know-how 
related to the research and 
development (R&D) of new product (or 
process) innovations. 
 




Formal collaborative arrangements 
among two or more firms to conduct 







arrangements between two or more 
organizations focused on downstream 
value chain activities.  
 
Krishnan, Martin, and 
Noorderhaven 2006 
Strategic Alliance Any extended cooperative agreement 
intended to jointly develop, 
manufacture, and/or distribute 
products. 
 




Contractual relationships undertaken 
by firms whose respective products 
are complements in the marketplace.  
 
Kale, Singh, and 
Perlmutter 2000 
Strategic Alliance A purposive strategic relationship 
between independent firms that share 
compatible goals, strive for mutual 
benefits, and acknowledge a high 







Strategic alliances are often created to develop new products as a response to 
complex market demands. Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) find that alliances with 
higher levels of knowledge redundancy and lower levels of relational embeddedness 
are associated with lower levels of information acquisition but higher levels of 
information utilization. The high levels of information utilization help alliance partners to 
enjoy increased levels of “new product creativity and faster speed of development due 
to synergy created by the redundancy of their product development-related knowledge, 
skills, and capabilities” (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001).  
 Strategic alliances are also useful with co-marketing efforts. Bucklin and 
Sengupta (1993) investigate co-marketing alliances, which are alliances between two or 
more partners who together market complementary products or product lines. Through 
the combined marketing efforts, each partner benefits because co-marketing alliances 
can intensify and build consumers’ awareness of benefits derived from the products’ 
complementarities. The authors suggest that co-marketing alliances can enhance the 
competitive advantage of each partner. They show that project selection, finding the 
right partner, and minimizing power imbalances have a direct effect on the effectiveness 
of co-marketing alliances.  
 Rindfleisch and Moorman (2003) study the effects of alliance characteristics on 
customer orientation. They find empirical support for the hypothesis that a firm’s 
participation in horizontal alliances weakens that firm’s customer orientation. This is not 
the case in vertical alliances. The reasoning is based on the idea that when a firm allies 
with a competitor, then the firm must be overly vigilant of the possibility that the 




focal firm will have to invest in monitoring of the partner rather than in understanding the 
customer. Furthermore, the authors suggest that a third-party monitor (e.g., government 
agency) and strong relational ties between the competing partners can attenuate the 
need to monitor each other and instead the slack resources can be devoted to customer 
orientation.  
 Luo et al. (2007) show how the profitability of horizontal alliances depends on 
competitor orientation. They find that a firm’s level of participation in horizontal rather 
than vertical alliances has an inverted U-shaped relationship with return on equity of 
that firm. This association strengthens when the focal firm’s competitor orientation 
focuses on building effective relationship between the allying rivals. However, if the 
focal firm’s competitor orientation focuses more on destroying the competition, then the 
inverted U-shaped relationship weakens such that the return on equity is lower and the 
dark side of the horizontal alliances presents itself sooner.  
 While these examples illustrate that strategic alliances can have a positive 
impact on various marketing-related phenomena, academic and popular press literature 
report that 50% to 80% of strategic alliances fail (Cui 2013; Greve et al. 2010; Kogut 
1989; Noordhoff et al. 2011). Various reasons have been attributed to failures of 
strategic alliances. However, the most common reason attributed to the high failure 
rates is opportunistic behavior within an alliance.  It is argued here that opportunistic 
behavior can be rogue-firm (i.e., firm-level) or deviant-personal (i.e., individual-level) in 
nature. Therefore, the next two sections review literature relevant to both rogue-firm and 




and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior on alliance outcomes are developed in the 
two sections.  
Rogue-Firm Opportunistic Behavior  
 
 Rogue-firm opportunistic behavior often is the primary construct of interest in 
strategic alliances research. A review of empirical research investigating opportunistic 
behavior and its antecedents is offered in Table 4. Rogue-firm opportunism exists in 
strategic alliances because of what game theory refers to as “mixed-motive social 
dilemma” (Dawes 1980). This dilemma exists in strategic alliances because “parties 
often have motives to cooperate and compete with each other, to maximize the 
collective interest yet also maximize their self-interest at the expense of the collective 
interest” (Ferrin et al. 2007, p. 468). Marketing scholars have also referred to this 
dilemma as a cooperation-competition tension (Li et al. 2010).  
 Definitions of opportunistic behavior differ across contexts, but the majority adapt 
the definition offered by Williamson (1979). He defines opportunism as “self-interest 
seeking with guile.” In his later work, Williamson (1985) elaborates more on this 
definition and explains that the guile presents itself in practice as a form of “lying, 
stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or 
otherwise confuse” (p. 47). Others have added to this list by equating the guile with 
shirking, deceiving, misrepresenting, cunning, evasive, devious, or deceitful behavior of 
one party towards another. In more general terms, opportunism can be thought of as an 
engagement in a behavior that goes against existing understanding or even against 
existing contract. Table 5 offers a representative list of definitions of opportunism seen 




an alliance partner’s own self-interest seeking and violations of expected norms of 
behavior at the expense of the other alliance partner – adapted from Jayachandran et 
al. (2013). Research devoted to conceptualization of types of opportunism is almost 
non-existent, despite the call for the need to understand different types of opportunism 
(Wathne and Heide 2000). To the best of my knowledge, only two manuscripts exist that 
attempt to develop a typology of rogue-firm opportunism. 
One of the two typologies is offered by Wathne and Heide (2000). They 
conceptually differentiate between active and passive opportunistic behavior. Active 
opportunism takes place when a partner purposefully breaks the contract in some way. 
For example, in marketing alliances and in horizontal alliances, territorial exclusivity 
contracts often exist between partners. These contracts are often and purposefully 
violated (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Heide, Dutta, and Bergen 1998). In R&D alliances, 
contracts are written to protect intellectual property brought into the alliance by each 
party and to establish levels of knowledge transfers. However, it is very common to see 
incomplete R&D contracts because the outcomes of R&D alliances are often unclear at 
the outset of the alliance (Xu, Fenik, and Shaner 2014). Purposeful violations of R&D 
contracts take place because of the incompleteness of the contracts.  
Passive opportunism takes place when a partner to the exchange purposefully 
holds back effort, know-how, or information that would otherwise enhance the outcomes 
of a partnership. Such hold backs drive Wathne and Heide (2000) to define passive 
opportunism as opportunism by omission. When a party omits some information from 
another party, it is not necessarily breaking an explicit contract, but it is jeopardizing the 























Bureaucratic structuring (+) 
Perception of coercive power (+) 











Dealer relationships of 




Gundlach et al. 
1995 
 
Disproportional commitment (+ marginal) 
Long-term commitment intensions (ns) 
Relational social norms (-) 
 

























Kale et al. 2000 (RC) Relational capital (+) 


















































































and Wu 2006 
 
Volatility w/ formal govern. (+) 
Volatility w/ relational govern. (ns) 
Ambiguity w/ formal govern. (ns) 








History of relationship 
Specific assets 
Duration 


















(OM) Output monitoring (-)  
(BM) Behavior monitoring (+) 
BM x microlevel social contracts for behavior (-) 





Relative firm size 
Supplier’s 
dependence on the 
buyer 















Own transaction specific investments (+) 
Partner transaction specific investments (ns) 
Environmental uncertainty (ns) 




















Table 5. Definitions of Opportunism 
 






Self-interest seeking with guile 
 
 
John 1984 Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Deceit-oriented violation of implicit or 
explicit promises about one’s 
appropriate or required role behavior.  
 
Wuyts and Geyskens 
2005 
Opportunism Self-interest seeking with guile; it 
includes such behaviors as lying and 
cheating as well as more subtle forms 
of deceit, such as not fully disclosing 
information or violating the spirit of an 
agreement. 
 
Luo 2006a Opportunism in a 
cooperative 
alliance 
The act or behavior performed by one 
party from one country to seek its 
unilateral gains at the substantial 
expense of other parties from other 
countries by breaching contract or 
agreement, exercising private control, 
withholding or distorting information, 
withdrawing commitments or 
promises, shirking obligations, or 
grafting joint earnings.  
 
Jayachandran et al. 2013 Postcontractual 
Opportunism 
One party acting in its own self-
interest at the expense of the other 











In their multi-method empirical study, Seggie, Griffith, and Jap (2013) examine 
how active and passive opportunism in interfirm relationships hinder satisfaction with 
the relationships’ performance. In their first experimental study, they show that firms 
have more tolerance towards passive opportunism than active opportunism. However, 
their follow up field study reveals that over an extended period of time, passive 
opportunism has a more detrimental impact on relationship satisfaction than active 
opportunism. Their second experimental study suggests that active opportunism 
immediately raises transaction costs and thus the value of the relationship is lowered. If 
passive opportunism lingers over time, the transaction costs necessary to counter 
passive opportunism become higher than the transaction costs needed to counter active 
opportunism. Overall, their findings support the notion that active and passive 
opportunism uniquely affect performance outcomes (Wathne and Heide 2000).  
 In his conceptual review of opportunism in inter-firm exchanges in emerging 
markets, Luo (2006b) differentiates between a strong and a weak form of opportunism. 
The strong form of opportunism presents itself when an alliance partner directly violates 
the contract of an alliance. Alliance contracts incorporate norms, clauses, and 
conditions that each party must follow. Luo (2006b) offers an extensive list of how 
strong form violations present themselves in practice. The strong form violations of a 
contract include:  
1) deceiving another party in critical information sharing as required by contract  
2)  stealing joint assets that belong to all exchange parties  





4)  exploiting a partner firm’s specific assets or appropriating a partner firm’s key 
personnel or know-how without provision or remedy 
5) colluding or bribing another party’s personnel (executive or board members) so 
that collective decisions or activities are undertaken only to the bribing party’s 
own advantage 
6)  failing to invest various resources, such as technologies, managerial expertise, 
capital, or human talents as required by contract 
7) cheating in recording and disclosing accounting information in search of higher 
unilateral returns or dividends 
8) evading contractual obligations in selling joint products, upgrading technologies, 
or building distribution channels 
9) terminating the contract or agreement without a partner firm’s consensus 
10) failing to honor contractual liabilities in undertaking collaborative operations or 
collective activities, such as joint research and development, joint production and 
marketing, and joint training and management    
 The weak form of opportunism presents itself when an alliance partner violates 
existing relational norms that are a common understanding among parties involved in 
the relationship but that are not explicitly stated in a contract. Examples of weak form 
opportunism are: 
1) terminating unwritten commitments or dishonoring oral promises 
2) not adhering to trust-building and equity-exchange principles 
3) breaking mutual forbearance and knowledge-sharing rules 




5) misrepresenting a party’s own abilities 
6) standing by unconcerned when another party or joint entity is suffering 
7) withholding full effort and cooperation in an ongoing relationship 
8) not adhering to explicit or implicit collective controls governing inter-party 
exchange 
9)  reacting dishonestly to contractual renegotiations or change 
10) making calculated efforts to confuse and manipulate information or incompletely 
disclose information to another party  
 Hawkins, Pohlen, and Prybutok (2013) empirically investigate under what 
circumstances buyers in buyer-supplier relationships engage in strong and weak forms 
of opportunism. Their findings suggest that when the leader of a buyer’s team is 
opportunistic in nature, engages in willful ignorance, and is characterized as dishonest, 
then the buyer firm is more likely to engage in weak-form opportunism, but not the 
strong-form opportunism. The authors argue that “under weak-form opportunism, 
buyers may feel less accountable and susceptible to punishment” (p. 1273). This is in 
accordance with the argument that weak-form opportunism is harder to detect since it 
does not explicitly violate the contract (Luo 2006b). On other hand, the power 
differential and competitiveness among partners cause buyers to engage in strong-form 
opportunism, but not weak-form opportunism. This is in accordance with the proposition 
that uncertainty due to bargaining asymmetry and competitiveness in the relationship is 
likely to cause the presence of explicit contract violations (Luo 2006b).    
 All conceptual and empirical research investigating opportunism converges on 




for interorganizational exchange (Luo 2006b); for example, it affects relationship 
satisfaction (Seggie et al. 2013),  financial and strategic performance (Gundlach and 
Cannon 2010; Luo et al. 2007; Wathne and Heide 2000), and long-term collaboration 
(Hawkins, Knipper, and Strutton 2009). This perspective is in line with game theory’s 
mixed-motive social dilemma present in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Since the 
prisoner’s dilemma game is closely related to relationships existent in the strategic 
alliances (Parkhe 1993) and since this game’s basic arguments are driving most 
hypotheses that follow in this dissertation, it is useful to review the game here.  
 Game theory researchers focus on studying factors that can influence levels of 
opportunistic behavior between two or more parties. Various game types have been 
investigated (e.g., single- vs. multiple-shot games, full- vs. partial-information available, 
trust games, prisoner’s dilemma, ultimatum game, social goods game, tit-for-tat, and 
many others), but the most applicable game to strategic alliances is the prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Experimental economists playing out the prisoner’s dilemma game and 
its variants investigate how monitoring (Axelrod 2006), trust (Cox 2004), and social 
identity (Chen and Chen 2011), among other factors, influence the utility function of 
each party involved in the game. Thus, prisoner’s dilemma application of game theory is 
very suitable to help explain how these factors affect rogue-firm and deviant-personal 
opportunism in strategic alliances.   
 In the prisoner’s dilemma game, two players are imprisoned due to a suspicion 
that they committed a crime. The two players are held in separate jail cells and are 
unable to communicate with each other. Therefore, each is unaware whether the other 




with crime partner) or whether the other became a snitch (i.e., defects by acting 
opportunistically). The authorities have sufficient evidence to convict both players on a 
lesser charge. If neither player snitches, both will receive a small punishment for the 
lesser charge. This is equivalent to mutual cooperation (MC). If one of the players 
decides to snitch while the other remains quiet, the snitch will go free. This is equivalent 
to unilateral opportunism (UO). Because of the snitch, the cooperative player will 
receive a heavy sentence. This is equivalent to unilateral cooperation (UC). If both will 
snitch, both will receive a moderate sentence. This is equivalent to mutual opportunism 
(MO) (Parkhe 1993). These four scenarios are depicted in a 2 x 2 matrix in Figure 2. 
In this game, the order of preferred outcome for each player is UO > MC > MO > 
UC. Regardless of what the other player decides to do, each player will benefit more 
from snitching than cooperating, because UO > MC and MO > UC. However, if both 
players decide to snitch, both will receive a longer sentence than if both would 
cooperate, because MC > MO. This is why the game is called the prisoner’s dilemma.  
 
 
Sentence (P1; P2) 
Player 1 (P1) 
Opportunistic Behavior Cooperative Behavior 
Player 2 (P2)  
Opportunistic Behavior 
Mutual Opportunism (MO) 
Sentence (moderate; moderate) 
P1: Unilateral Cooperation (UC) 
P2: Unilateral Opportunism (UO) 
Sentence (high; go free) 
Cooperative Behavior 
P1: Unilateral Opportunism (UO) 
P2: Unilateral Cooperation (UC) 
Sentence (go free; high) 
Mutual Cooperation (MC) 
Sentence (low; low) 
    




 Similarly, the dilemma exists in strategic alliances. On one side, partners to an 
alliance are motivated to behave opportunistically because of what is known as 
“learning races” (Kale et al. 2000). Learning races arise from the hidden motive driven 
by partner-firms’ desire to gain access and internalize other partners’ know-how faster 
than the other partners, hence the name learning races. If such opportunistic behavior is 
unilateral (UO), then the alliance offers a higher return to the opportunistic party than 
the cooperative alternative (MC) would offer. Thus, the prisoner’s dilemma assumption 
that UO > MC is satisfied in a strategic alliances setting. However, on the other side of 
the dilemma, alliance partners know that the partner may behave opportunistically as 
well. Since both partner-firms are expected to behave opportunistically, then both will be 
hesitant to contribute through cooperation. As a result, the alliance will fail to create 
value and will be likely to dissolve – this would be an example of MO. Therefore, the MC 
option starts to look more attractive to partner-firms, because MC > MO. In order to 
resolve the dilemma in strategic alliances, partner-firms must decide on an effective 
governance mode. In other words, partner-firms must evaluate the environment within 
which the alliance exists and access which relational factors are likely to drive the 
alliance to a prosperous future.  
 Ultimately, what the prisoner’s dilemma game illustrates is that opportunistic 
behavior appears to be a safer and a more profitable option in the mixed-motive social 
dilemma scenarios such as strategic alliances (Parkhe 1993). Therefore, opportunism is 
to some degree always expected in strategic alliances. Opportunistic behavior creates 
moral hazards (Williamson 1985) which must be preempted with partner monitoring 




Whether the nature of the governance mode is more economic (e.g., monitoring), 
relational (e.g., trust) or psychological (e.g., alliance identity), developing and 
maintaining it increases transaction costs. Empirical research supports the notion that 
rogue-firm opportunistic behavior increases transaction costs and, consequently, 
damages outcomes of the partnership; for example, partner relationship satisfaction 
(Seggie et al. 2013), financial and strategic performance (Gundlach and Cannon 2010; 
Luo et al. 2007; Wathne and Heide 2000), and long-term collaboration (Hawkins et al. 
2009). Thus, in line with the prisoner’s dilemma game and with the conceptual and 
empirical works in strategic alliance research, it is hypothesized here that, 
 
H1: Rogue-firm opportunistic behavior is negatively associated with alliance 
performance.  
 
 In summary, currently only two conceptually developed typologies of opportunism 
exist in interorganizational relationships that are actively present in empirical research. 
There is active and passive opportunism (Wathne and Heide 2000) and there is strong 
and weak opportunism (Luo 2006b) typology. Both Luo (2006b) and Wathne and Heide 
(2000) acknowledge that opportunism is a complex phenomenon that deserves 
additional attention and that future research should devote time to develop additional 
typologies of opportunism. We must understand dimensionalities of opportunism before 
we can further clarify some of the contradictory empirical findings in the literature. 
Therefore, this dissertation addresses the plentiful examples of individual-level 




by differentiating between rogue-firm (firm-level) and deviant-personal (individual-level) 
opportunistic behavior. The next section explores deviant-personal opportunistic 
behavior. 
Deviant-Personal Opportunistic Behavior  
 
 Opportunistic behavior is also a problem at the individual alliance employee level. 
This dissertation refers to individual-level misconduct as deviant-personal opportunistic 
behavior. This naming is consistent with the study of deviant workplace behavior in 
psychology and organizational behavior literature (Zagenczyk et al. 2011).  
 Deviant behavior is a real organizational threat. Literature reports that anywhere 
between 33 to 75 percent of all employees engage in some form of deviant behavior 
(Robinson and Bennett 1995), which is also evident from a national poll in which 48 
percent of workers admitted to a behavior that was harmful to either their organization 
or their co-workers (Litzky, Eddleston, and Kidder 2006). Not only is this a real threat, 
but it is also a costly one. The financial losses stemming from deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior nationwide exceed $200 billion annually and cause 30 percent of 
all business failures (Bolin and Heatherly 2001).  
 Robinson and Bennett (1995) define employee deviance as “voluntary behavior 
that violates significant organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well being of 
an organization, its members, or both.” Other definitions are consistent with this one, 
and often this definition is adopted verbatim (Bolin and Heatherly 2001; Litzky et al. 
2006). This definition is merged with the definition of opportunistic behavior offered by 
transaction costs economics to arrive at the definition of deviant-personal opportunistic 




here as an individual employee’s self-interest seeking through devious means that 
threatens the well being of an alliance, its members, or both.  
 A seminal typology of deviant workplace behaviors is offered by Robinson and 
Bennett (1995). The authors used multidimensional scaling technique to investigate 
similarities across 45 different deviant behaviors. They found that deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior can be categorized along two dimensions. The first dimension is 
concerned with the severity of the behavior. Its anchors are “minor” and “serious” 
deviant behavior. The second dimension is concerned with who is being harmed by the 
deviant behaviors. Its anchors are “organizational” and “interpersonal” deviant behavior.  
 These two dimensions together create four quadrants. The organizational-
serious quadrant is labeled “property deviance” and includes behaviors such as 
sabotaging R&D efforts, accepting kickbacks, lying, and stealing knowledge or 
technologies from a company. The organizational-minor quadrant is labeled “production 
deviance” and includes such behaviors as withholding effort, wasting resources, leaving 
early, and taking excessive breaks. The interpersonal-serious quadrant is labeled 
“personal aggression” and includes behaviors such as verbal abuse, stealing from co-
workers, endangering co-workers, and even sexually harassing others. The 
interpersonal-minor quadrant is labeled “political deviance” and includes behaviors such 
as showing favoritism, gossiping, blaming others, and competing non-beneficially. While 
deviant behaviors from all these quadrants may exist in an alliance setting, the most 
damaging to the alliance outcomes are the behaviors from the two organizational 
quadrants. These deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors are likely to create distrust 




being of the offended partner firm. Thus, the partner may interpret deviant-personal 
opportunism as rogue-firm opportunism. Consequently, due to deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior, the offending partner’s reputation will suffer. 
 An alliance partner-firm’s employees assigned to a newly formed alliance can 
experience a role ambiguity. Among few other triggers, Litzky et al. (2006) point out that 
role ambiguity could be a trigger of deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. Role 
ambiguity implies that an employee does not have an adequate level of information 
about his or her new role. The lack of information creates a sense of uncertainty about 
the expected behavior in the new role. Consequently, one’s job performance may suffer, 
and employees may respond by behaving opportunistically in order to compensate for 
the low job performance. The authors point out that role ambiguity can be especially 
salient for employees who are in boundary-spanner roles. Partner firm employees 
assigned to an alliance are in a boundary-spanner role where they are viewed as a 
liaison between their firm and the partner firm.    
 The deviant-personal behavior of alliance employees can be either self-serving 
or company-serving. For example, due to the stress from role ambiguity mentioned 
above or simply due to the competitive nature of an employee, alliance employees are 
likely to engage in self-serving deviant behavior that improves employees’ personal job 
satisfaction, future job advancements, or plainly a behavior that integrates their job 
more effectively with their lives. The self-serving deviant behavior is not specifically 
targeted at one or the other alliance partner as long as the behavior results in personal 
gain of sorts. Also stemming from the role ambiguity or the competitive nature, 




upper management’s expectations. However, because of the ambiguity, the 
interpretation of what is expected may be misjudged, resulting in deviant behavior 
towards one’s own firm or towards the other alliance partner-firm. One’s competitive 
nature is more likely to result in deviant behavior against the other alliance partner-firm 
in order to attempt to speedily satisfy upper management’s performance goals. In 
summary, whether the deviant behavior is self-serving or targeted against one of the 
alliance partners, ultimately such behavior can be viewed as a threat to one of the 
partners. Consequently, such behavior is likely to be met with countermeasures in the 
form of retaliation or increased costs due to the need to monitor more closely the 
alliance employees.  
 The prisoner’s dilemma game explains deviant-personal opportunistic behavior 
similarly to rogue-firm opportunistic behavior because it is conceptualized at both the 
individual and group level. The offended partner in an alliance may view the deviant-
personal opportunistic behavior as a direct threat targeted at its firm. Therefore, as 
game theory suggests, a defection by one player will be met with a defection of the 
second player during the next move. Such retaliation in strategic alliances is 
counterproductive to the alliance, and the outcomes of such retaliation result in loss of 
profits, poor reputation, less likely future partnerships, increased transaction costs, or 
even early termination of the alliance (Litzky et al. 2006). In any way, the performance 
of the alliance suffers, thus: 
 
H2: Deviant-personal opportunistic behavior is negatively associated with 






 Controlling opportunistic behavior in a relationship between alliance partners can 
take on a formal or an informal form (Carson et al. 2006). Formal control is represented 
by often written contractual safeguards which are enforced by monitoring of exchange 
partners, while informal control is represented by often unwritten relational contracts 
and norms (Tiwana 2010). Relational contracts can exhibit themselves through trust or 
identification with alliance partners. Both formal and relational contracting in strategic 
alliance settings have proved to be valuable; however, relational contracting so far has 
not received empirical inspection on par with the empirical inspection of formal 
contracting (Carson et al. 2006). Moreover, three areas exist in strategic alliances 
literature that call for more research. First, the majority of existing research has focused 
on either formal or relational contracting, but not both. As a consequence, theory is 
unclear whether the two interact or supplement each other (Tiwana 2010). This is 
supported by the conceptual argument that “neither economic (e.g., monitoring) nor 
social forces (e.g., relative alliance identity or trust) by themselves suffice in 
suppressing opportunism; a mix of both will always be more operative and effective” 
(Luo 2006a, p. 59). In the case of theory of marketing channel relationships, Stern and 
Reve (1980) similarly criticize that fragmenting the exchange relationship theory into 
rational economic-based and social behavioral-based arguments, without consideration 
of their interactions, can produce only a limited knowledge of the phenomenon. Second, 
organizational identity is practically non-existent in strategic alliances research or in 
interfirm relationships in general, yet there are calls for incorporating this construct into 




Third, each study about interfirm relationships is often guided by one isolated theory. 
While there are good reasons to do so, such isolated perspectives also have limited 
external validity and as a result have constrained the academic conversation about 
phenomena related to strategic alliances (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005). An empirical 
response to the points above will contribute by offering an explanation of existing 
contradictory findings in strategic alliances and interfirm relationships literature in 
general.  
 For these reasons, three relationship factors are explored in this dissertation. 
Specifically, the next section reviews existing literature about and related theories to 
monitoring, relative alliance identity, and trust. Game theory is utilized throughout the 
review because it is foundational to the three constructs and their relevant theories. The 
main effects, the interactive effect between trust and monitoring, and their impact on 
opportunistic behavior are explored as well.   
Monitoring 
 
 Transaction cost economics (TCE) draws on the game theory-based argument 
which suggests that monitoring of alliance partners should aid in suppressing 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1985). The prisoner’s dilemma game tells us that 
monitoring allows an alliance partner to collect evidence of whether the other alliance 
partner is going to cooperate. Lacking monitoring means lacking information about a 
partner’s likelihood to cooperate; therefore, game theory rationale is for an alliance 
partner to compete. In game theory terms, monitoring allows the game to be played 
under the assumption of full information about other’s behaviors. More realistically, 




1985). Either way, this argument suggests that monitoring creates conditions where 
alliance partners can be more cooperative instead of competitive towards each other. 
As a result, less opportunism exists in the relationship, and, consequently, the alliance 
can be more profitable. While empirical research of monitoring effects is still relatively 
scarce (Heide et al. 2007), some evidence of the positive side of monitoring exists in 
marketing literature.  
 Definitions of monitoring differ slightly across disciplines and across contextual 
differences of individual studies. However, in general monitoring can be defined as “an 
effort made by one party to measure or meter the performance of another” (Heide et al. 
2007). A representative set of definitions used across marketing, management, and 
economics literature is presented in Table 6. In this dissertation, monitoring is defined 
as procedures designed and incorporated within a strategic alliance relationship by one 
party to acquire information and ascertain a partner’s activities and conduct – adapted 
from Gundlach and Cannon (2010). 
Since formal control is defined with respect to the level of monitoring between 
two parties (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007), Anderson and Oliver (1987) draw on 
formal control literature (Ouchi 1977) to introduce their conceptualization of outcome-
based and behavior-based monitoring of sales personnel. Recently their typology was 
adapted into interfirm relationships (Heide et al. 2007). In strategic alliances, an 
outcome-based monitoring system (OBMS) can be defined as a monitoring system 
involving measurements of the visible consequences of an alliance partner (Heide et al. 
2007). These visible consequences can vary across alliances but often include some 




on a given objective, and delivering an expected level of R&D quality. For example, an 
alliance partner may monitor the quality of components produced by other partners that 
are necessary to get closer to the ultimate R&D alliance goal of producing new 
innovative products, technology, or knowledge. Under OBMS, individual partners are 
left alone to choose how they go about delivering these components, and fairly little 
direction for each partner is offered about how to achieve the outcomes that are 
monitored (Anderson and Oliver 1987). Therefore, OBMS is focused on the alliance 
goals, but it can miss partners’ behaviors that may not align with the monitoring 
partner’s corporate mission statement as pertained to, for example, labor practices, 
supplier relations, customer relations, etc.  
Based on the TCE perspective, OBMS has been described as a market oriented 
flat monitoring system, where competitive forces of the market determine survival 
(Anderson and Oliver 1987; John and Weitz 1989). In a strategic alliance, if one partner 
does not meet pre-specified objectives, and builds its reputation as being opportunistic, 
future participation in potentially lucrative alliances with the same partner, or other firms, 
will not be possible for the opportunistic firm. Thus, firms that can offer successful 
outcomes by eliminating inefficient and unattractive processes on their own are more 
likely to enjoy economic rents out of an alliance setting and participation in future 
alliances based on their positive reputation of being able to deliver results. These future 
partnership considerations are referred to in game theory as the “shadow of the future” 
(Bó 2005; Heide and Miner 1992; Parkhe 1993). However, the need to deliver results no 
matter what may originate from behaviors that are opportunistic in nature. Thus, there is 




Table 6. Definitions of Monitoring 
 
Source Construct Name Definition 
 




Behaviors conducted by one party to 
gain information about another party’s 
level of cooperation.  
 
Heide et al. 2007 General 
Monitoring 
An effort made by one party to 
measure or meter the performance of 
another. 
 
Heide et al. 2007 Output Monitoring Measurement of the visible 
consequences of a partner’s actions.  
 
Heide et al. 2007 Behavior 
Monitoring 
Evaluation of the processes that are 
expected to produce the focal 
outcomes.  
 
Gundlach and Cannon 
2010 
Monitoring Procedures designed and 
incorporated within an exchange 
relationship by one party to acquire 
information and ascertain a partner’s 




A behavior-based monitoring system (BBMS) is defined as a monitoring system 
involving evaluation of the processes that are expected by management to produce the 
desired outcomes of a strategic alliance (Heide et al. 2007). Under BBMS, individual 
partners of an alliance must regularly report to the alliance management about their 
daily tasks and how they go about completing specified objectives. Alliance 
management offers specific direction for each partner and monitors each partner’s 
actions and behaviors along the way. For example, under BBMS an alliance partner can 
monitor other partners by inspecting their production facilities, question their internal 




upcoming new product, technology, or knowledge that is likely to result from an alliance. 
Therefore, BBMS can help partner-firms maintain their corporate mission statement 
standards by monitoring specific behaviors of other partners. This extensive behavior-
based monitoring may, however, un-purposefully cause loss of focus on the outcomes 
of R&D alliance.  
According to TCE, BBMS is suspect due to the attempt to substitute outcome-
based with behavior-based performance signals (Anderson and Oliver 1987). BBMS 
may be viewed as a command-based hierarchical type of control system. Williamson 
(1981) questions management’s motives behind attempts to directly control individual 
behaviors rather than choosing more objective control measures. He states that such 
management has egoistic motives instead of desire for the behavior controls to truly 
provide higher performance. Thus, BBMS may be viewed as opportunistic in nature and 
cause negative perception of the monitoring by the monitored alliance partner.  
 The two monitoring systems are an extreme example of a continuum (Oliver and 
Anderson 1995). Both have advantages and disadvantages that must be carefully 
considered. BBMS is very qualitative in nature, which can translate into subjective 
evaluations. The hierarchical aspect of BBMS can quickly become too complex and 
create organizational paralysis. BBMS can, however, be very valuable when uncertainty 
among alliance partners exists. Under uncertain conditions, outcomes may be unknown 
and thus not possible to measure. Therefore, OBMS can be a dangerous option under 
uncertain conditions. Consequently, alliance partners may behave opportunistically 
under uncertain conditions without BBMS. On the positive side, OBMS is much more 




“survival of the fittest” market oriented principle. Due to these advantages and 
disadvantages of both monitoring systems, a hybrid monitoring system may offer higher 
performance outcomes (Oliver and Anderson 1995). Therefore, attempting to maximize 
one or the other may result in an inferior performance when compared to finding an 
optimal point between the two. Hence, it is suggested that the focus should be on 
optimization of the two rather than maximization of one or the other monitoring system 
(Oliver and Anderson 1995). 
 In their study, Heide et al. (2007) investigate the effects of monitoring on 
opportunistic behavior in the interfirm relationship between buyers and suppliers in a 
building material product category. They find that the effects differ across form of 
monitoring and based on the context in which monitoring takes place. For the form of 
monitoring, they consider output and behavior monitoring (Anderson and Oliver 1987). 
They find that output monitoring decreases opportunism and behavior monitoring 
increases opportunism. They built their reasoning based on TCE and reactance 
theories. As stated earlier, output based monitoring is cheaper to implement and a less 
obtrusive form of monitoring. The opposite is true for behavior monitoring. The 
monitoring partner has to spend more time, effort, and finances to implement behavior 
monitoring, and the monitored party perceives such efforts as detrimental to its 
autonomy and self-controlling entity. Hence, opportunistic behavior increases under 
behavior monitoring.  
 Their study has certain limitations, however. First, they assume that output and 
behavior monitoring is an “either / or” choice, which contradicts with the 




(Anderson and Oliver 1987; Oliver and Anderson 1995). The original authors point out 
that both types are often used by any given organization and that future research should 
focus on finding an optimal point between the two (i.e., optimal ratio) rather than which 
one is the better or worse option. Second, their study is limited to a very specific product 
category; thus, their generalizability suffers. The third point is not a limitation per se, but 
it is important to this dissertation. The authors examine supplier-buyer relationships 
which have been shown to behave differently from strategic alliances. Thus, their 
research is informative, but may not generalize into strategic alliances literature.  
 In their examination of buyer-supplier relationships, Gundlach and Cannon 
(2010) examine whether verification strategies positively impact partners’ performance. 
They conceptualize verification strategies as monitoring, assurance, and corroboration. 
Assurance is operationalized as information exchange (e.g., sharing proprietary 
knowledge, joint planning and sharing costs, supply and demand information), and 
corroboration pertains to actively monitoring the external market. The most relevant 
dimension of their verification strategies to this dissertation is monitoring. They 
operationalize monitoring as formal supplier evaluations through “formal collection of 
information on product quality, delivery, price, support services, etc., through inspection 
and evaluation processes” (Gundlach and Cannon 2010, p. 404). Their logic behind 
their hypothesis is based on TCE. Specifically, they argue that monitoring allows the 
monitoring partner to make sure that the monitored partner performs as expected and 
does not deviate from cooperative behavior. However, they do not find support for their 
positive relationship hypothesis. This lack of support may suggest that monitoring may 




factors may be. Later sections of this chapter will address the possibility of interaction 
between monitoring and trust.  
 In summary, game theory and TCE arguments suggest that monitoring can 
attenuate information asymmetries between alliance partners and therefore lower 
opportunistic behavior. Also, the continuum between outcome-based and behavior-
based monitoring suggests that some optimal point between the two types of monitoring 
produces more favorable partner behaviors. This point is incorporated into the adapted 
monitoring scale used in this dissertation. Therefore, it is hypothesized here that:  
 
H3: Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors. 
 
H4: Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with rogue-firm 




 Trust is an important construct in exchange relationships that influences the 
behaviors of the partners. Many studies incorporate trust into their conceptual models, 
yet the precise effects of trust are still not known (Gundlach and Cannon 2010). It is an 
intricate and elusive construct that is presented in literature with various definitions and 
dimensionalities. Thus, before investigating the effects of trust on opportunistic 




 Gulati (1995) differentiates between knowledge-based trust and deterrence-
based trust. He conceptualizes knowledge-based trust based on previous business 
experience between two alliance partners. If two partners have had previous business 
engagements, they have likely learned how trustworthy the other party is. Thus, each 
party developed knowledge about the other’s trustworthiness. Deterrence-based trust is 
conceptualized based on utilitarian considerations. The expectations of sanctions if one 
misbehaves can be costly to an alliance partner. The costs are loss of repeat business 
with the same partner and hindered reputation other market actors allocate to the 
misbehaved firm, which consequently can create long-term costs of transacting with 
future potential alliance partners (i.e., game theory’s “shadow of the future” mentioned 
previously). 
 In their conceptual paper about trust and control in strategic alliances, Das and 
Teng (2001) differentiate between competence trust and goodwill trust. They view 
competence trust as “the expectation of technically competent role performance” (Das 
and Teng 2001, p. 256). This expectation can be based on an alliance partner’s 
demonstrated ability or expertise. The conceptualization is similar to knowledge-based 
trust (Gulati 1995). Goodwill trust refers to “the expectation that some others in our 
social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special 
concern for other’s interest above their own” (Das and Teng 2001, p. 256). 
 Williamson (1993) distinguishes between calculative trust and personal trust. 
Calculative trust, similarly to deterrence-based trust (Gulati 1995), occurs when the 
trustor chooses to entrust the trustee on the basis of an anticipated utility calculation. 




2001) trust, is based on the trustor’s feeling and belief that entrusting the trustee is the 
right choice.  
 While dimensionalities of trust have been suggested, at the aggregate level, trust 
refers to trustor’s expectancy of reciprocal behavior of the trustee where a payoff comes 
for something done or given (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). The definitions of 
trust vary across studies. However, at the core of each definition is the belief that the 
other party in a relationship will do as promised or as expected. Therefore, trust is 
defined here as the perceived credibility that the alliance partner will behave in the best 
interest of the exchange relationship. Representative definitions of trust from across 
disciplines are listed in Table 7. 
 Trust as an antecedent to relational behaviors has consistently been found to be 
an important factor in relationship marketing literature. However, trust has a bright and a 
dark side. On the bright side, trust has been shown to be an important relational 
mechanism. For example, Hewett and Bearden (2001) investigate how multinational 
corporations (MNCs) manage their global marketing operations. They find that trust 
between the headquarters of a MNC and its foreign subsidiaries enhances cooperation 
among the two units and consequently improves performance of the whole organization. 
 In their empirical investigation of new product alliances, Rindfleisch and 
Moorman (2001) find support for the hypothesis that relational embeddedness will be 
positively related to information utilization in new product alliances in the form of new 
product creativity and new product development speed. They argue that under 
conditions of relational embeddedness, partners experience higher levels of trust. As a 




Hunt 1994), which lowers opportunism. Under a smaller possibility of opportunistic 
behavior, information can be utilized more effectively. Similar arguments are presented 
by Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande (1992), who find that embedded relations 
between marketing research firms and their customers improve utilization of the 
marketing research information generated by the marketing research firms. They 
operationalize embedded relations in terms of organizational trust.  
Şengün and Wasti (2007) test some of the propositions offered by Das and 
Teng’s (2001) conceptual framework of trust, control and risk in strategic alliances. In 
their investigation of pharmaceutical buyer-supplier relationships, the authors find 
empirical support that goodwill trust is positively related with willingness to take a 
performance risk. Same cannot be said about competence trust. They operationalize 
performance risk in terms of delays in payments and delays in order delivery. They 
justify their finding by stating that goodwill trust is based on the trustor’s perception of 
the trustee’s willingness to return a “favor in tight situations.” Therefore, while one might 
have the ability (i.e., competence) to deliver or pay on time, it does not mean that one is 
willing to offer that competence because other goodwill or relational ties take 
precedence. Hence, the definition used here does not necessarily consider an alliance 
partner’s ability, but instead focuses on the credibility or expectation that one can be 
trusted to not behave against expectations. Relationship marketing theory (Morgan and 
Hunt 1994) proposes that trust is one of the key antecedents to cooperative behaviors 
and performance outcomes of an exchange relationship; however, more recent 





Table 7. Definitions of Trust 
 






A type of expectation that alleviates the 
fear that one’s exchange partner will act 
opportunistically.  
 
Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman 1995 
Trust The willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important 
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 





Trust Belief or confidence about another party’s 
integrity (including reliability, predictability, 
and dependability) and/or benevolence 
(including goodwill, motives, intentions, 
and caring).  
 
Zaheer, McEvily, and 
Perrone 1998 
Trust The expectation that an actor (1) can be 
relied on to fulfill obligations, (2) will 
behave in a predictable manner, and (3) 
will act and negotiate fairly when the 






Trust The extent to which a firm believes that its 
exchange partner is honest and/or 
benevolent.  
Hewett and Bearden 
2001 
 
Trust The perceived credibility and 
benevolence of a target of trust. 
 
Sarkar et al. 2001 
 
 
Mutual Trust The degree of confidence shared by 
partners regarding each other’s integrity. 
Krishnan et al. 2006 Interorganizational 
Trust 
The expectation held by one firm that 
another will not exploit its vulnerabilities 







In their examination of interactive effects between trust and verification strategies 
in supplier-buyer relationships, Gundlach and Cannon (2010) point out the dilemma of 
trust, which suggests that trust in an exchange partner can also have a dark side. The 
logic behind the dilemma of trust lies in the realization that trust can be abused. A 
trusted party to an exchange may justify to itself that behaving opportunistically will not 
necessarily be viewed by the trustor as a mischievous undertaking since the 
relationship is built on trust. Gundlach and Cannon’s (2010) empirical findings suggest 
that to achieve higher performance outcomes under high levels of trust, it can be 
beneficial for the trustor to incorporate some verification strategies. Specifically, they 
find that frequent information sharing and monitoring of the external market can limit an 
exchange partner’s exposure to the dark side of trust. However, they do not find support 
for their substitutive interactive effect between trust and monitoring of a partner, 
suggesting that monitoring of partners and trust are complementary instead (this 
interaction is explored in a later section). 
   Anderson and Jap (2005) offer a review of several cases of failed supplier-
buyer exchange relationships. They conclude that many of these failed relationships 
initially benefited from trust; however, at a certain point trust became the culprit behind 
their failures. They state that “the very factors [trusted & close relationships] that make 
partnerships with customers or suppliers beneficial can leave those relationships 
vulnerable to deterioration” (p. 75). Furthermore, they conclude that trust allowed the 
entrusted suppliers in the relationships to “systematically cheat their clients on an 
ongoing basis” (p. 77). The business cases reviewed clearly present that the initial 




examples is especially telling. A supplier of auto parts developed a very close 
relationship with its automaker customer. They built trust with the customer by 
encouraging its employees to go to dinners, play football, and go to other social events 
with employees from the automaker firm. Once trust was established, the purchasing 
department eased up on its total quality management practices. As a result, the supplier 
started to cut its production costs by eliminating one of three coats of paint. The cost 
savings were not shared with the customer. “In this manner, the trust, social 
relationships and investments that were developed to make the relationship successful 
became the doorway to the dark side” (Anderson and Jap 2005, p. 77). In trust-based 
relationships, partners have a better chance of getting away with opportunistic behavior 
(Selnes and Sallis 2003). This view is supported by Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002) who 
caution that empirical evidence fails to support the positive relationship between trust 
and performance and caution that “trust may be in danger of being oversold and 
inappropriately used in practice” (p. 62).  
 From the game theory perspective, trust “facilitates cooperation because a party 
who believes the partner is trustworthy will develop a higher willingness to risk, and 
therefore in conditions of risk, the party is more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior” 
(Ferrin et al. 2007, p. 474). In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the riskier but more 
profitable option is for parties to cooperate. With trust, one is more likely to engage in 
the riskier proposition due to the belief that the other party will choose to cooperate. 
This basic idea is also reflected in social exchange theory, where trust is an important 
relational mechanism that encourages future exchange in a relationship (Morgan and 




 Unlike social exchange theory, game theory goes beyond the bright side of trust 
and offers an explanation why trust has a curvilinear effect on opportunistic behavior. 
Game theoreticians consider the trust game theory to explain the curvilinear 
relationship. The trust game is a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma game and is played 
as follows. There are two parties to a game; one is called the trustor and the other 
trustee. Both receive some set dollar amount at the beginning of the game. For an 
example, consider Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004), who started each party with a 
$.40 amount. The trustor then has to make a decision to send his $.40 to the trustee or 
to keep all the money. If he keeps the money, the game ends. If he decides to send the 
money, then the trustee receives $.80 (double the $.40 to indicate benefit of 
cooperation). The trustee then has to make a decision to send $.60 (half of his current 
$1.20) back to the trustor, or he can decide to keep all the money. If the trustee keeps 
all, the game ends. If the trustee decides to send $.60 back to the trustor, the game 
goes to a second round. This is isomorphic to a strategic alliances setting where firms 
have to make a decision whether to disclose know-how, make alliance specific 
investments, or to sacrifice some other exposure in hopes to make the outcome of an 
alliance more profitable than an outcome of working individually (this is the doubling of 
$.40 effect).  
 The trust game can be a single-shot game, in which case it is almost identical to 
classical prisoner’s dilemma game. However, the trust game can also consist of several 
rounds. Therefore, trust games are often set up with a certain termination rule, which 
suggests the expected length of the game. Generally, three decision rules are used in 




termination rules are (1) finite horizon – parties here are aware that the game has a 
finite number of repetitions; (2) unknown horizon – participants do not know the number 
of rounds in the game; and (3) random-stopping rule – participants are made aware that 
each round comes with some probability of game termination. Most often termination 
probability used is 0.2, or 20 percent.  
 Normann and Wallace (2012) find that in social dilemma settings (e.g., strategic 
alliances), the termination rule does not have a significant effect on average cooperation 
rates. In other words, on average the same level of opportunistic acts exists across the 
three termination rules. However, they also find that cooperation over time is affected by 
the termination rule. Specifically, a known finite horizon and a random-stopping rule with 
high termination probability reveal negative time trend when it comes to cooperation. 
This is suggestive of the curvilinear effect of trust on cooperation, where exchange 
relationships initially benefit from trust-based exchanges; however, over time trust 
becomes the culprit behind opportunistic acts. This is likely due to both parties’ end-
game strategies clearly present in the prisoner’s dilemma game where the equilibrium 
exists in the scenario of both parties defecting. Thus, trust initially helps parties 
overcome the worry of end-game strategy, but ultimately, such strategies take over and 
the relationship moves to the equilibrium.  
 Similarly, Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004) investigate how experience (i.e., 
repeated supergame) in a trust game affects levels of trust. They consider finite and 
random-stopping termination rules. They find that the level of trust is the same between 
the two termination rules when parties to the exchange are inexperienced (i.e., first time 




decreases in the finite horizon game, but does not decrease in the random-stopping 
horizon game. Moreover, they find that regardless of experience or termination rule, 
trust level declines over rounds of a game, but it resets when new relationships begin. 
These findings again point to the curvilinear conceptualization of the relationship 
between trust and opportunistic behavior. In early stages of the game, trust establishes 
cooperation, but as the relationship matures, trust is misused towards one’s self-
interest.  
 
H5: Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior, such that the intermediate level of trust is most effective 
at minimizing deviant-personal opportunistic behavior.  
 
H6: Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with rogue-firm 
opportunistic behavior, such that the intermediate level of trust is most effective 
at minimizing rogue-firm opportunistic behavior.  
 
Relative Alliance Identity 
 
 Organizational identity has a rich history in academic literature. Yet, the construct 
is not often considered in interorganizational research and is non-existent in strategic 
alliances. Recently, scholars started to call on researchers to consider this construct in 
organizational boundaries settings such as strategic alliances (Alvesson et al. 2008; 
Santos and Eisenhardt 2005). Alvesson et al. (2008) argue that “the turn to identity 




it continues establishing lines of inquiry by different means” (p. 6). Moreover, 
organizational identity is regarded as superior to some other theoretical explanations of 
competition and opportunism (Santos and Eisenhardt 2005). Therefore, organizational 
identity is incorporated into this dissertation, and it is argued that alliances that enjoy 
higher levels of relative alliance identity will also enjoy lower levels of rogue-firm and 
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors.   
 An individual’s identity within a group affects the individual psychologically and 
behaviorally. From the psychology perspective, group identity helps one to answer the 
question “Who am I?” This is possible because one’s self-image is defined by 
membership to a certain group (Tajfel 1982). From the behavioral perspective, group 
identity helps one to answer the question “How should I act?” Once an individual 
reaches some level of self-identity, then the individual strives to maintain that identity. 
To maintain their identity, individuals start to behave in ways advocated by the social 
group with which they identify. It is this behavioral dimension that makes social identity 
important to organizational studies because organizational identity can influence 
intergroup opportunistic behavior, conflict, and cooperation (Ashforth and Mael 1989) in 
a way to maintain a positive identity of self. However, employees can belong to various 
groups within an organization (Tajfel and Turner 1979), such as marketing, engineering, 
sales, organizational committee membership, level of management, etc. Similarly, 
alliance employees can identify with their respective firm or with the alliance. For this 
reason, capturing relative alliance identity as opposed to just alliance identity is a more 
precise measure of how significant an employee’s alliance identity truly is. Fisher, Maltz, 




organization. Therefore, their definition is adapted here to define relative alliance 
identity as the extent to which alliance managers feel a sense of connection with the 
alliance rather than with their respective alliance partner-firm. Definitions related to 
organizational identity are presented in Table 8.  
Marketing literature utilizes the social identity theory in a variety of domains. In 
the sales management literature, Wieseke et al. (2012) explore how salespeople’s 
identification with their work team versus identification with the organization influences 
their stereotypes towards the headquarters. Their findings suggest that work team 
identification cultivates negative stereotyping towards the headquarters more strongly 
when organizational identity is low. Furthermore, they show that through headquarters 
stereotypes, team work identification mixed with low organizational identification 
indirectly impacts sales performance of the sales force. Since negative stereotypes 
inhibit positive behavior (Ashforth and Mael 1989), together their results show that 
identification can influence organizational behavior. 
 Social identity has also been applied in cross-functional research in marketing. 
Often seen problem in organizations is the communication difficulty between marketing 
and engineering function. Fisher et al. (1997) offer two factors affecting productive 
communication behaviors between the two functions. The first is information-sharing 
norms defined as “organizational guidelines and expectation that foster the free 
exchange of information between functions” (p. 56). These norms dictate how 
organizational members should communicate across functions. However, the authors 
find that in the marketing-engineering interactions, the norms work only in the case 




organization. They find that when employees have high “relative functional 
identification,” then the effect of organizational norms is muted. The second factor 
affecting communication behaviors of these two functions are goals that are integrated 
across the functions. Integrated goals are “superordinate to the interests of individuals 
… because the achievement of each person is facilitated by the achievement of others” 
(p. 57). Therefore, in the case of high relative functional identity, integrated goals are a 
more suitable way to promote productive communication behavior than information-
sharing norms.  Furthermore, the authors show that productive communication behavior 
leads to positive communication outcomes. Similarly, the conceptual model of this 
dissertation suggests that opportunistic behavior will have negative consequences on 
performance outcomes.  
 Within the marketing ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature, 
Martin et al. (2011) position organizational identity as the mechanism driving responses 
to institutional pressures and marketing ethics initiatives. They differentiate between 
authentic and calculative ethical identity. Calculative ethical identity is driven by external 
motivation to respond to pressures from the market. Such external motives are often 
viewed by consumers as “greenwashing” and can have a detrimental impact on firm 
performance. Authentic ethical identity is driven by internal motivation of the 
organization to do practice in a socially responsible way. Through experimental game 
theory modeling, the authors show that authentic ethical identity has a more beneficial 
impact on performance outcomes than does calculative ethical identity. The construct of 





Table 8. Definitions Related to Relative Alliance Identity 
 
Source Construct Name Definition 
 






The extent to which managers feel a 
sense of connection with their function 
compared with the organization as a 
whole.  
 
Peteraf and Shanley 1997 Strategic group 
identity 
A set of mutual understandings, 
among members of a cognitive 
intraindustry group, regarding the 
central, enduring, and distinctive 
characteristics of the group.  
 
Haslam 2004 Social 
identification 
A relatively enduring state that reflects 
an individual’s readiness to define 
him- or herself as a member of a 
particular social group.  
 






The degree to which customers and 
employees, respectively, identify with 
a company to fulfill self-definitional 
needs and the resultant emotional 
reactions to this identification. 
 
Wieseke et al. 2009 Organizational 
identification 
A process in which leaders instill into 
followers a sense of oneness with the 
organization.  
 








Institutional norm adherence due to 
internal motivations. 
 
Institutional norm adherence due to 
external motivations.  
Wieseke et al. 2012 Social 
identification 
The process by which a group 
becomes directly linked to its 







Zaheer et al. (1998) investigate supplier-buyer relationships within an electrical 
manufacturing industry. They find that trust negatively impacts costs of negotiation 
between partners to the exchange. They argue that negotiations costs decrease when 
trust exists between partners, because contracts can be written and agreements can be 
reached more quickly as partners are able to readily arrive at a “meeting of the minds.” 
They argue that the meeting of the minds is possible thanks to a high level of trust. 
However, it can be argued that their proposition is incorrectly attributed to trust. A 
meeting of the minds suggests that two parties are closer to being “one” or, in other 
words, more closely identify with each other. Thus, their conceptualization more closely 
matches the idea that if two alliance partners can identify relatively more with the 
alliance than with their own firm, then the alliance is likely to enjoy lower negotiation 
costs. However, they failed to operationalize meeting of the minds as identity, thus 
further analysis is warranted. 
 Organizational identity has been explored in other marketing domains as well. 
For example, Homburg et al. (2009) find that employee-company identification 
influences customer-company identification, which ultimately impacts customer loyalty 
and willingness to pay. Their empirical finding suggests that this path explains loyalty 
and willingness to pay beyond the more established employee job satisfaction-customer 
satisfaction path. Organizational identity also influences internal marketing. Wieseke et 
al. (2009) find that employees’ organizational identification (OI) is stronger whenever 
their leaders’ OI is stronger. Moreover, they find that employees’ OI improves their 
performance, and when the leader and the employees have strong OI, their business 




presented here suggest that organizational identity influences organizational members’ 
behavior positively and consequently improves a firm’s performance.  
 Differences between identity and seemingly related constructs. Some may see 
the relationship marketing literature synonymous with social identity literature. While a 
majority of scholars have come to a conclusion that the two, in fact, offer distinct 
perspectives on organizational studies, it is useful to address the concern. Identification 
with a group can exist even in the absence of interpersonal cohesion, similarity, or 
interaction. The absence of the relational factors (e.g., trust) does not change the fact 
that social identification (e.g., relative alliance identity) impacts affect and behavior. A 
series of laboratory experiments proved that in-group favoritism occurs even without 
interaction with in-group members or with other out-groups (Tajfel 1982). Explicit 
random assignment of participants into groups leads to discrimination against out-
groups and enhanced cooperation between members of an in-group (Locksley et al. 
1980). Social identity is a psychological phenomenon. Members of an in-group “credit 
the group with a psychological reality apart from their relationships with its members” 
(Ashforth and Mael 1989, p. 24). Ultimately, relational factors such as trust don’t have to 
be present to have an identity.  
 Similarly, Homburg et al. (2009) offer conceptual differentiation between 
customer-company identification and customer commitment. They point out that 
identification “includes both self-definitional and an emotional meaning for a person” 
(p.42). Commitment does not cover the psychological oneness and self-definition. A 




does not have any other alternative, but that does not necessarily mean that the 
customer identifies with a firm.  
 Santos and Eisenhardt (2005, p. 502) conceptually argue that organizational 
“identity often dominates” other more established perspectives about organizational 
boundaries. It is argued here that alliances that are able of reshaping the boundaries of 
their partners such that the bordering partner boundary weakens, while the outer 
boundary of the alliance strengthens, will experience a decreased level of both rogue-
firm and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. From a game theory point of view, 
such reshaping of a boundary creates “identity costs” (Uzea and Fulton 2009) which 
hurt parties that choose to defect (i.e., be opportunistic) from the prisoner’s dilemma 
game (i.e., the alliance). The authors find that breaking away from the strategic group 
negatively affects the break-away party’s utility. In other words, if an alliance partner 
behaves opportunistically against the alliance, not only will this partner incur economic 
costs, but also identity costs. This happens because, for a partner who highly identifies 
with an alliance, opportunistic behavior is incompatible with the partner’s identity. In 
turn, the possibility of these utility costs (identity costs) deters a party’s incentive to 
swerve from the in-group norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).  
 Additionally to the prisoner’s dilemma game, social identity proves to have a 
positive effect on cooperative behaviors in a variety of game types. For example, low 
group identity leads to an inefficient equilibrium solution in a minimum effort game 
(Chen and Chen 2011); in a repeated-play public goods game, a team identity limits 
shirking and free-riding behavior (Eckel and Grossman 2005); and in bargaining games 




and consequently improve cooperative behavior among in-group members (McLeish 
and Oxoby 2007). Considering the game-theoretic and social identity theory (SIT) 
perspectives, intra-organizational empirical support, and experimental economics 
support, it is hypothesized here: 
 
H7: Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior. 
 
H8: Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with rogue-firm 
opportunistic behavior. 
 
Interactive Effect between Trust and Monitoring 
 
 Gundlach and Cannon (2010) hypothesize that the positive effect of verification 
strategies on performance is weaker at higher levels of trust. They operationalize 
verification strategies as a three-dimensional construct that includes (1) monitoring of 
exchange partners, (2) monitoring the external market, and (3) presence of a certain 
level of information exchange between partners. The most relevant to this study is the 
first dimension. Specifically, with this dimension they argue that if one party has trust in 
another, then there is no need to monitor the trusted party as much. Their hypothesis is 
based on the logic that monitoring and trust are two substitutive interfirm control 
mechanisms, hence the expected negative interaction. However, their empirical findings 
do not support this hypothesis, thus suggesting that the two constructs may be 




interaction is supported by the proposition that “in strategic alliances the trust level will 
exert a moderating effect in a manner so that control mechanisms will achieve a greater 
level of control in high-trust situations than in low-trust situations” (Das and Teng 1998, 
p. 503). Similarly, Carson et al. (2006) conclude that formal (i.e., monitoring) and 
relational contracts (i.e., trust) are not simply substitutive. Game theory also offers a 
logical explanation of why the interaction between trust and monitoring is of a 
complementary rather than a substitutive nature.  
 In the investment game, which is based on the trust game, player A is given $10. 
Player A is then given an option to keep the $10 or send some amount between $0 and 
$10 to a player B who is located in a separate room. Player A is also told that whatever 
amount he or she sends to player B will automatically triple even before getting to player 
B. Player B is not aware of the tripling effect. Player B is then given an option to either 
keep all the money or send some amount back. Just like in the prisoner’s dilemma 
game, the Nash equilibrium would suggest that player A should act opportunistically and 
not send any money to player B. However, results of this experiment suggest that 
people will send on average $5.16 to an unknown counterpart in another room trusting 
that the person will reciprocate and send at least some money back (Berg et al. 1995). 
In this game, player A does not know player B, does not know the average amount sent 
by other participants, and does not know the probability of player B sending some 
amount back. Thus, player A’s decision is solely based on trust and belief that player B 
will reciprocate cooperatively.  
 The fact that on average players A send out $5.16 to players B is suggestive of a 




player B, then player A would not send any money. Sending out the whole $10 would be 
suggestive of maximum trust. The fact that the average of $5.16 is right in the middle of 
the range is indicative of people’s wanting to trust others but being cautious at the same 
time. In other words, people don’t mind trusting others but at the same time would like to 
verify others’ credibility before engaging in more involved cooperative decisions. If 
information asymmetries would be lowered through monitoring, then that would suggest 
to player A that he or she can expect an increased level of reciprocity from player B. 
Consequently, the average amount sent by player A would increase under scenarios of 
having close to full information about the expected behavior of player B (Berg et al. 
1995).  This logic lands support for complementary interactive effect between trust and 
monitoring being superior to a main effect of one or the other. Formally,  
 
H9: The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring.  
 
H10: The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce rogue-firm 
opportunistic behavior beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring. 
 
Alliance Partner Stability 
 
 
  The internal environment of an alliance, in other words, the relationship stability 
between two partners, determines the degree of trust, monitoring, and relative alliance 




degree of stability among factors related to the internal alliance environment as 
presented by the presence of organizational proximity and presence of partner 
independence (adapted from Luo 2006b). Alliance partner stability exists under low 
organizational distance (i.e., organizational proximity) and low dependence on the 
alliance partner (i.e., independence). Effects of alliance partner stability on the three 
relational factors (trust, monitoring, and relative alliance identity) are discussed next.  
Impact on Monitoring 
 
Lack of stability between alliance partners creates uncertainties that require 
alliance partners to acquire more information about the environment they operate in to 
keep the transaction costs down (Luo 2006b). From a game theory perspective, stability 
is necessary to keep the parties from misbehaving towards each other. Therefore, in the 
absence of stable conditions, more control is required by incorporating monitoring 
efforts into the exchange relationship.  
  Game theory suggests that in strategic alliances the risk arises from unilaterally 
losing core proprietary know-how to the partner. Alliances are burdened with the hidden 
motives driven by partner-firms’ desire to gain access and internalize other partners’ 
know-how faster than the other partners. This phenomenon is known as “learning races” 
(Kale et al. 2000). Learning races are intensified when interpartner competition is high, 
because the party that can learn and absorb knowledge faster can also respond faster 
and more effectively to the competitive nature of its partner. As a result, alliance 
partner-firms are prone to increase their monitoring efforts when interpartner 




 Furthermore, horizontal alliances experience more competition among alliance 
partners then vertical alliances (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). As a result of 
competitive forces among partners, alliance partners must increase their monitoring 
efforts (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003) despite the findings that such increased 
monitoring efforts may damage customer orientation (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003) 
or increase the possibility of marketing warfare among partners (Luo et al. 2007) – a 
closely related concept to the learning races mentioned above. While competition is 
clearly stronger in horizontal alliances, it can also exist in vertical alliances. Suppliers 
create alliances with downstream partners who do not offer significant market share, but 
can offer know-how that may be beneficial to other downstream partners outside of the 
focal alliance; this is another illustration of the learning races concept in strategic 
alliances. Taken together, stable conditions where interpartner competition is not 
present would lower the need to monitor alliance partners because there is no sense of 
urgency to collect more information about the partner.  
 It is well established in strategic alliances literature that similar organizational 
cultures create more certain and predictive conditions between alliance partners (Choi 
and Lee 1997; Simonin 1999). Such stable conditions result in higher levels of 
knowledge transfer, which is critical to productive cooperative relationships. 
Consequently, alliance partners don’t have a reason to monitor their alliance partners. 
On other hand, if organizational differences exist, such differences create internal 
struggles due to alliance partner firms’ differing management styles, marketing 
practices, and difficult inter-firm communication. Lu and Beamish (2004) find that 




argument is based on differing organizational and national cultures. Moreover, Sirmon 
and Lane (2004) argue that in international joint ventures it is the organizational culture 
differences that impact the joint venture performance more than national culture. 
Overwhelmingly, existing literature supports the idea that organizational distance 
between business partners results in increased levels of partner monitoring.  
  In summary, alliance partner stability decreases the need to monitor alliance 
partners, because stable conditions – lack of competitiveness between partners, 
organizational proximity, and partner independence – do not require heightened 
alertness in the form of increased levels of partner monitoring. Stated formally:  
 
H11: Alliance partner stability is negatively associated with monitoring.  
 
Impact on Trust 
 
Prior alliance research suggests that firms in competitor-dominated alliances 
display lower levels of mutual trust than firms in channel-dominated alliances (Bucklin 
and Sengupta 1993). This weakened level of trust arises from firms in competitor-
dominated alliances facing a higher potential for opportunism that is present due to the 
competitive forces existent among partners of a competitor-dominated alliance 
(Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003). The competitive forces among alliance partners signal 
threats to the alliance that create unstable conditions in the relationship.  
 As stated previously, working with alliance partners that have different 
organizational cultures creates liabilities due to coordination costs (Lu and Beamish 




Literature recognizes several categories of organizational cultures. The most often cited 
are clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy (Moorman 1995). Similarly to national 
cultures, the more collectivistic cultures are expected to act more cooperatively then 
individualistic cultures, and some cultures tolerate more uncertainty and instability than 
others (Hofstede 1980). It is easier to rely on trust in collectivistic cultures because by 
definition one can expect more relational types of behaviors. On other side, trust may be 
harder to come by in individualistic countries.  
 In his seminal work about alliance partner familiarity and trust, Gulati (1995) finds 
empirical support for the hypothesis that familiarity with an alliance partner improves 
trust. In other words, partnering with a partner who has a proven record improves trust, 
because the proven record creates stable conditions within which the relationship can 
flourish. Stated formally: 
 
H12: Alliance partner stability is positively associated with trust.  
 
Impact on Relative Alliance Identity 
 
Social identity theory maintains that the motives behind one’s identification with a 
certain social group can be due to the desire to achieve self-enhancement (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979), but also due to desire to reduce social uncertainty (Grieve and Hogg 
1999). Uncertainty identity theory, an extension of SIT, suggests that one’s identification 
with a social group (i.e., a strategic alliance) can be a direct response to perceived 
uncertainty from the social context (Hogg 2000). Similarly, game theory states that the 




2000; Uzea and Fulton 2009). This suggests that salience of any instability between 
partners influences the magnitude of identity costs. In the context of this dissertation, 
lack of alliance partner stability can be viewed as a source of uncertainty that can 
determine an alliance employee’s degree of identity with the alliance.  
 The presence of uncertainty between partners can destabilize the alliance 
identity. Strategic alliances literature often cites three sources of partner instability. First 
is the interpartner competition. If the partners themselves are competitors, as is the 
case in horizontal alliances, then there is a stronger sense of internal competitive 
intensity than in the case of vertical alliances (Luo et al. 2007). In this case, it is 
expected that individual actors will identify more with their firm rather than with the 
alliance.  
 The second source of instability is due to organizational distance among the 
alliance partners. “The underlying values and attitudes of different cultural groups can 
influence the behavior of those groups, as well as the nature of decisions they make” 
(Hewett and Bearden 2001).  Empirical studies exist linking cultural distance (Hofstede 
1980) to level of cooperativeness among two parties from different national cultures 
(Chatman and Barsade 1995; Li et al. 2010; Williams et al. 1998). Organizational 
distance is also more closely associated with the most significant dimension of 
organizational identity – distinctiveness. Ashforth and Mael (1989) state that 
distinctiveness in values, beliefs, and social norms of a group in relation to those of 
comparable groups enhances identity with an in-group. Organizational cultures have 
distinctive values, beliefs, and social norms. Thus, managers are less likely to identify 




distance between alliance partners. Therefore, organizational proximity is viewed here 
as one indicator of alliance partner stability that can enhance relative alliance identity.  
 The third potentially destabilizing factor is the degree to which an alliance partner 
is dependent on the other. If one party is dependent on another, the dependent party 
tends to lose its autonomy and power to decide for itself (Geyskens et al. 1996). Such 
loss of autonomy can result in less identification with the power-wielding partner. Also, 
the power-wielding partner may see an opportunity to act opportunistically against a 
partner whose defenses are weakened due to being dependent on the partner. 
Together, the three sources of alliance partner stability will help social actors of the 
alliance to strongly identify with the alliance. Stated formally: 
 
H13: Alliance partner stability is positively associated with relative alliance 
identity.  
 
Table 9 below offers a summary of hypotheses introduced in this chapter. Table 
10 offers summary of construct definitions used in the conceptual model of this 















Rogue-firm opportunistic behavior is negatively associated with alliance 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2 Deviant-personal opportunistic behavior is negatively associated with 
alliance performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3* Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors. 
 
Hypothesis 4 Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with rogue-firm 
opportunistic behaviors. 
 
Hypothesis 5* Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior, such that the intermediate level of trust is most 
effective at minimizing deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 6* Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with rogue-firm 
opportunistic behaviors, such that the intermediate level of trust is most 
effective at minimizing rogue-firm opportunistic behavior.  
 
Hypothesis 7* Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors. 
 
Hypothesis 8* Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with rogue-firm 
opportunistic behaviors. 
 
Hypothesis 9* The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring. 
 
Hypothesis 10* The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce rogue-firm 
opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring. 
 
Hypothesis 11* Alliance partner stability is negatively associated with monitoring. 
 
Hypothesis 12* Alliance partner stability is positively associated with trust. 
 
Hypothesis 13* Alliance partner stability is positively associated with relative alliance 
identity. 
 














Collaborative exchange relationships between two or more firms 
to gain a competitive advantage from joint efforts, risk sharing, 
and meeting complex market demands. 
 
Rogue Opportunism An alliance partner’s own self-interest seeking and violations of 





An individual alliance employee’s self-interest seeking through 
devious means that threatens the well-being of an alliance, its 
members, or both. 
 
Monitoring Procedures designed and incorporated within a strategic alliance 
relationship by one party to acquire information and ascertain a 
partner’s activities and conduct. 
 
Trust The perceived credibility that the alliance partner will behave in 




The extent to which alliance managers feel a sense of 






The degree of stability among factors related to the internal 
alliance environment as presented by the lack of interpartner 
competition, presence of organizational proximity, and presence 
















CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the method that was used in this 
research. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section details the multi-period 
behavioral simulation that was used to collect and analyze Study 1 data. A general 
overview is provided, the sample is described, the data collection procedure is 
explained, the measurement technique is discussed, and the analytical techniques for 
testing hypotheses are reviewed. The second section explains the methodology that 
was used to analyze cross-sectional data in Study 2. Similarly to Study 1, a general 
overview is provided, the sample is described, the data collection procedure is 
explained, the measurement technique is discussed, and the analytical techniques are 
reviewed.  
Study 1: Behavioral Simulation of Supplier-Buyer Relationships 
 
 To gain more realism from studies on exchange relationships, it is useful to 
analyze data collected from a behavioral business simulation. Exchange relationship 
environments that mimic a true business environment are valuable for studying 
exchange behavior such as opportunism (Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983). Research in 
marketing has employed a variety of simulation techniques to study exchange 
relationships (Gundlach et al. 1995). A marketing channel simulation by Cadotte (1990) 
has been successfully utilized in marketing research studying phenomena related to 
business-to-business relationships (Arias‐Aranda 2007; Gundlach et al. 1995; Gundlach 
and Cadotte 1994). This simulation has been identified as the most relevant to the 






 The multi-period behavioral simulation closely mimics vertical strategic alliances 
between suppliers and resellers of microcomputer industry in its early stages of 
development. The simulation data together with a survey can capture individual 
partners’ strategic decisions, contractual arrangements, strategic behavior, and the 
outcomes of the relationship. Moreover, the contractual arrangements range from arm’s 
length to long-term relational contracts, which can be very useful when assessing some 
of the constructs of interest here.  
Sample 
 
 Senior undergraduate students in marketing participated in the simulation. The 
participants were enrolled in a capstone marketing strategy class across several major 
U.S. based universities during the fall 2014 and spring 2015 semesters. Students within 
any given class were randomly assigned to a group of four or five member teams. Each 
team was then randomly assigned to be a manufacturer or a reseller of 
microcomputers. Prior to initiating the simulation itself, each team self-selected its 
members’ role responsibilities. Each member chose primary and secondary role 
responsibilities from the following options: president, supply chain relationships, 
marketing & marketing research, sales management, purchasing, and accounting & 
finance. In total, the sample consisted of 228 potential respondents. This sample size 
ultimately produced 134 evaluated relationships between suppliers and resellers (refer 







 A survey was administered to participants prior to the last cycle (i.e., prior to the 
last business quarter being processed). The survey was administered during this time to 
allow for an in-simulation monetary incentive that was reported on each team’s financial 
statements after the last business quarter was processed. Performance data was 
obtained from the objectively collected data through the simulation itself. The survey 
data along with performance data available from the simulation were then analyzed.  
Measurement: Alliance Partner Stability 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, alliance partner stability is the degree of stability among 
factors related to the internal alliance environment as presented by the presence of 
organizational proximity and presence of partner independence (adapted from Luo 
2006b). Alliance partner stability is measured as a composite score of these two 
dimensions.  
Organizational Proximity. An adaptation of Simonin’s (1999) measure was used 
to capture similarities in alliance partners’ organizational cultures. The measure is a 7-
point Likert scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items are (1) the 
management style of your partner is very similar to the management style of our firm; 
(2) the business culture of your partner is very similar to ours; and (3) the business 
practices of your partner are very similar to the business practices of our firm. 
Partner Independence. An adaptation of Sivadas and Dwyer (2000) measure 
was used to capture the degree to which partners were independent from each other. 
The measure is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items 




resellers; (2) It would have been difficult to replace this partner; and (3) Our strategic 
objectives would suffer greatly if we would have lost this partner. Since it was of interest 
to capture independence rather than dependence of alliance partners, reverse coded 
values were used for analysis purposes. 
Measurement: Relational Factors 
 
Trust. The measure of trust was adapted from the Hewett and Bearden (2001) 
adaptation of the Doney and Cannon (1997) scale. The measure is a 7-point Likert 
scale consisting of six items. Specifically, the items are (1) this partner kept promises it 
made to our firm; (2) this partner was not always honest with us (R); (3) we believe the 
information this partner provided to us; (4) this partner was trustworthy; (5) this partner 
was genuinely concerned that our supply chain relationship succeeds; and (6) Our firm 
trusts that this partner kept our best interests in mind.  
Monitoring. A combination of existing measures of monitoring was adapted from 
sales literature (Anderson and Oliver 1987) and supplier-buyer relationships literature 
(Gundlach and Cannon 2010; Heide et al. 2007). Anderson and Oliver’s (1987) 
measure of monitoring efforts is within the sales management literature. Their measure 
was adapted and brought into supplier-buyer relationships literature by Heide et al. 
(2007). Gundlach and Cannon (2010) developed their own measure of monitoring of 
B2B exchange relationships. While not one of the three measures on its own translates 
well into the context of this dissertation, combining the three measures together offered 
a strong starting point for a measure of monitoring strategic alliance partners. The 
measure used here is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of four items. Specifically, the 




the following dimensions: (1) overall investment in the relationship; (2) level of 
cooperation; (3) activities outside of our supply chain relationship; and (4) response 
speed when undergoing contract negotiations.  
 Relative Alliance Identity. This measure was adapted from Fisher et al. (1997) 
and Wieseke et al. (2012). The measure is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of five items. 
Specifically, the items are (1) seeing both our firm and [partner name] succeed would 
feel more satisfying than seeing only our firm succeed; (2) attacks by other firms on 
[partner name] would feel like attacks on our own firm; (3) someone praising our 
relationship with [partner name] would feel like a personal compliment; (4) if I had to 
make a choice between doing what was best for my firm or for the supply chain 
relationship with [partner name], I would do what was best for the relationship; and (5) 
when I talked with other about the relationship with [partner name], I usually say “we” 
rather than “they.” 
Measurement: Rogue-Firm and Deviant-Personal Opportunism 
 
Rogue-firm Opportunism. Several operationalizations of opportunistic behavior 
exist in literature. The differences stem predominantly from contextual variations. While 
not one measure of opportunism seems to dominate in the literature, all the measures 
share some commonalities. The measure used in this dissertation is adapted from 
Gundlach et al. (1995) for three reasons. First, this measure captures the shared 
commonalities in a most effective manner. Second, the authors study buyer-supplier 
exchange relationships. The relationship between buyer and supplier is most often the 
relationship represented in vertical alliances. Vertical alliances are the studied sample 




simulation used in this study. Thus, using a measure that is proven to work in the same 
simulation environment is warranted. The measure is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of 
four items. Specifically, the items are (1) this partner exaggerated needs to get what it 
desires; (2) this partner was not always sincere; (3) this partner altered facts to get what 
it wanted; and (4) This partner breached agreements to its benefits.  
 Deviant-Firm Opportunistic Behavior. Individual alliance employees engage in 
opportunistic behavior passively or actively. Individuals who engage in passive 
opportunistic behavior don’t seek out such behavior, but instead when an opportunity 
presents itself they don’t necessarily do anything to correct their behavior. On the other 
hand, individuals who actively behave in an opportunistic manner seek out relationship 
arbitrages that hurt some other employee or party involved in the exchange. To capture 
this passive and active dimension of opportunism, a measure from Seggie et al. (2013) 
was adapted here. Some adaptation was necesary because their research investigates 
passive and active opportunism at the partner-firm rather than individual level. The 
measure is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of five items. Specifically, the items are (1) 
people delivered on their promises; (2) people offered their best effort to make the 
relationship work; (3) people responded in timely manner to our inquiries; (4) people 
provided truthful information to us; and (5) people followed closely their verbal 
agreements with our firm.  
Measurement: Outcomes 
 
Performance outcomes were measured using two measures obtained directly 
from the objective simulation data: (a) partner’s return on assets (ROA) and (b) 




obtained from the financial statements of each firm. The end of the simulation ROA was 
used here (i.e., ROA after the last business quarter was processed). The gross profit 
from the focal relationship was computed as the revenue minus the cost of products 
sold as a result of a specific relationship rather than just an overall firm’s gross profit 
that covers business dealings across various relationships. Strategic alliance research 
often relies on perceptual measures of performance because it is difficult to obtain 
objective data for a specific alliance. This is an often noted limitation of strategic alliance 
research. It is a limitation of Study 2 in this dissertation as well (refer to Study 2 section 
below). However, the use of the business simulation is very helpful in this regard since it 
is possible to obtain objective performance data not only at the firm level but at a 
business relationship level. Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported in Chapter 4 
because the objective data allow for direct interpretation of the beta coefficients. In the 
case of ROA, the beta coefficient represents a percentage change in the ROA for each 
additional unit of deviant-personal or rogue-firm opportunism. In the case of gross profit, 
the beta coefficient represents the gross profit dollar change for each additional unit of 
deviant-personal or rogue-firm opportunism. 
Measurement: Controls 
 
Universe Quarters. This variable is used to control for number of simulated 
business quarters in the simulation. The simulations used by professors across the US 
come in two different versions. One version is four quarters long, and the other version 
is six quarters long. All other aspects of the simulation are identical. The length of the 
simulation could affect financial outcomes as well as the relational variables examined 




UniverseID. This variable is used to control for possible differences due to 
number of different class sections. Each simulation session is referred to by the 
management team of the simulation and by the simulation coaches as a universe. 
Often, one universe exists per each class. The data was collected across various 
classes from various US-based universities. These location variations could introduce 
variance within the collected data. Controlling for this potential noise will minimize the 
error term in the analysis.  
Analysis 
 
 Structural equation modeling in AMOS version 20 was utilized to assess the 
measurement model. SEM is the appropriate technique used to purify the measurement 
items for each of the constructs shown in the conceptual model of this dissertation 
(Figure 1 in Chapter 1). A measurement model seeks to evaluate how well the observed 
indicators (survey data points) serve as a measurement instrument for the latent 
variables depicted in the conceptual model of this dissertation. This statistical technique 
allows the testing of construct validity (i.e., convergent validity, and discriminant validity) 
within a single research study (Garver and Mentzer 1999) by utilizing confirmatory factor 
analysis. 
 Previous studies utilizing this specific business simulation that investigated 
business-to-business relationships successfully utilized multiple regression technique 
(Gundlach et al. 1995; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994). For this reason, hierarchical linear 
regression was also used here to analyze the hypothesized relationships in SPSS 
version 22. In addition, as conceptual models become more complex, it becomes 




the model. Hierarchical linear regression (HLR) can be used in such instances to help 
identify which terms of the regression models make a significant statistical and practical 
contribution to the conceptual model. HLR is often used to compare successive 
regression models and to determine the significance that each of the terms introduced 
in any successive regression model has above and beyond the formal model. Each 
HLR model introduces a new set of regression terms in addition to the previous model 
in a hierarchical manner. 
Study 2: Cross-Sectional Examination of Strategic Alliances 
 
 This study examines the hypothesized relationships across a cross-sectional 
sample of strategic alliances. Specifically, the interest is to examine (1) contextual 
factors that affect the presence or the need for the relational factors, (2) the direct 
effects and the interaction between trust and monitoring on rogue-firm and deviant-
personal opportunistic behavior, and (3) the impact of opportunistic behaviors on 




 The sample frame for this study came from the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
Platinum database. SDC database is the most extensive and most reliable secondary 
database utilized in empirical research of strategic alliances (Schilling 2009). The 
sample frame consists of strategic alliances that were in existence as of January 1st, 




place during February and March of 2015. This time lag will allow the capture of 
outcome variables for fiscal year 2014.  
 The starting sample size consisted of 1,944 strategic alliances where both 
partners were from the US. The US based partners-only sample was considered for two 
reasons. An international sample would introduce unnecessary noise in the data due to 
different national cultures. The data needed for calculating the environmental dynamism 
control variable and variables used to analyze endogeneity concerns (See Chapter 4) 
are readily available only for US industries. The sample consisted of strategic alliances 
that were established between January 1st, 2010 and December 31st, 2014 and still met 
the criteria mentioned above. Data collection continued until a sample size of 180 
completed responses was established. Considering similar data collections attempts in 
strategic alliances literature (e.g., Rindfleisch and Moorman 2003; Sartor and Beamish 
2014), this sample size is sufficient to allow for empirical evaluation of the conceptual 
model presented in this dissertation.     
Procedure 
 
 Existing research utilizing secondary datasets to study partner-level and alliance-
level constructs is plentiful (e.g., Sampson 2007). However, secondary data alone does 
not offer proper proxies for studying individual-level variables such as deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior and even some firm-level relational constructs. This may be 
another reason why opportunistic behavior at the individual level has been ignored in 
the existing literature. To assess both rogue-firm and deviant-personal opportunistic 
behavior, the secondary SDC data was combined with a primary survey data collection. 




such as surveys have been used in prior research successfully (Krishnan et al. 2006; Li 
et al. 2010). 
 The survey instrument was constructed utilizing the measures from Study 1. 
Minor adjustments were made to some of the measures in order for the measures to be 
more suitable for the context of this study. The changes predominantly consisted of 
minor wording edits that did not change the meaning of the original items. Face validity 
of the wording changes was discussed among academic experts. Based on their input, 
the survey instrument was appropriately adjusted and finalized.  
 Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), Mergent Database, Ward’s Business Directory of US 
Private and Public Companies, corporate websites, or SEC filings were utilized to 
collect contact information for each of the partner firms represented in the final sample 
of strategic alliances. A key informant from each partner firm from the sample was 
identified, contacted, and prequalified by an email (Campbell 1955). This approach 
helped with (1) assessing whether the key informant is highly knowledgeable about the 
specific alliance, (2) obtaining cooperation, and (3) verifying the informant’s email. It 
was expected that some of the key informants were no longer working with the firm 
participating in a respective alliance, while others were not interested in participating in 
the study. This expectation ultimately eliminated some alliance partner firms from the 
sample (refer to Chapter 4 for more details). However, the vast number of alliances 
established during the time frame considered ultimately provided a sufficient sample 
size.   
 To help increase the response rate, each participant was promised the following 




1) $20 towards St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital.  
2) Respondents were assured that their individual responses would stay highly 
confidential and that the researchers would adhere to a strict university data 
collection policy.  
3) Anonymity was also promised to respondents. However, in order to donate the 
$20 towards St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, respondents’ names and 
email addresses were collected and disclosed through the survey to the primary 
researcher only.  
4) A summary of generalized findings was offered to each respondent.  
Measurement 
 
 The measurement section is split into five sections describing variables of 
interest from left to right on the conceptual model depicted in Chapter 1. Specifically, the 
sections are alliance partner stability, relational factors, opportunism, outcomes, and 
controls. 
Measurement: Alliance Partner Stability 
 
 As stated in Chapter 2, alliance partner stability is the degree of stability among 
factors related to the internal alliance environment as presented by the presence of 
organizational proximity and presence of partner independence (adapted from Luo 
2006b). Alliance partner stability is measured as a composite score of these two 
dimensions. 
 Organizational Proximity. Adapted Simonin’s (1999) measure was used to 




point Likert scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items are (1) the 
management style of our alliance partner is very similar to the management style of our 
organization; (2) the corporate culture of our alliance partner is very similar to ours; and 
(3) the business practices of our alliance partner are very similar to the business 
practices of our organization  
 Partner Independence. The measure was adapted from the dependence 
measure established by Sivadas and Dwyer (2000). The measure is a 7-point Likert 
scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items are (1) our alliance partner 
provided vital resources we would find difficult to obtain elsewhere; (2) it would be 
difficult to replace our alliance partner; and (3) our strategic objectives would suffer 
greatly if we would lose our alliance partner. Since it was of interest to capture 
independence rather than dependence of alliance partners, reverse coded values were 
used for analysis purposes. 
Measurement: Relational Factors 
 
 Trust. The same measure as in Study 1 was used to capture trust in an alliance 
partner. It is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of six items. Specifically, the items are (1) 
the alliance partner firm keeps promises it makes to our firm; (2) the alliance partner 
firm is not always honest with us (R); (3) we believe the information that the alliance 
partner firm provided to us; (4) this alliance partner firm is trustworthy; (5) the alliance 
partner firm is genuinely concerned that our alliance succeeds; and (6) our firm trusts 
that the alliance partner firm keeps our best interests in mind.  
Monitoring. The same measure as in Study 1 was used here to capture 




into the context of this study. For example, the reference to the simulation’s “supply 
chain relationship partner” was replaced with “partner” to better reference the alliance 
partner that the respondents were thinking of while taking the survey. The measure is a 
7-point Likert scale consisting of four items. Specifically, the items are (1) partner’s 
overall investment in the relationship; (2) partner’s level of cooperation; (3) partner’s 
activities outside of the relationship; and (4) response timeliness of the partner. 
 Relative Alliance Identity. The same measure with slight changes was used here 
as in Study 1 to capture relative alliance identity. It is a 6-point Likert scale consisting of 
five items and anchored by “my firm” and “the alliance.” Using these anchors forced 
respondents to cognitively recognize which organization they identify with more – the 
firm or the alliance. The items used here are (1) [my firm/the alliance]’s successes are 
my successes; (2) when someone criticizes the colleagues in [my firm/the alliance], it 
feels like a personal insult; (3) when someone praises [my firm/the alliance], it feels like 
a personal compliment; (4) if I had to make a choice between doing what was best for 
my firm or for the alliance, I would do what was best for [my firm/the alliance]; and (5) 
when I talk about the colleagues in [my firm/the alliance], I usually say “we” rather than 
“they.” 
Measurement: Rogue-Firm and Deviant-Firm Opportunism 
 
 Rogue-Firm Opportunism. The same measure as in Study 1 was used to capture 
rogue-firm opportunism in an alliance partner. It is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of 
four items. Specifically, the items are (1) our partner firm exaggerated needs to get what 




partner firm alters facts to get what it wants; and (4) our partner firm breaches formal or 
informal agreements to its benefits.      
 Deviant-Personal Opportunistic Behavior. The same measure as in Study 1 was 
used to capture deviant-personal opportunism. It is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of 
five items. The following preamble was used to introduce the items: “To what extent 
would you agree/disagree that certain individuals from the partner firm …” Then, the 
items that followed are (1) … do not deliver on their promises; (2) … withhold effort; (3) 
… responded in timely manner to our inquiries (R); (4) … provide false information; and 
(5) … breach agreements to benefit personally. 
Measurement: Outcomes 
 
 Alliance Financial Performance. To capture the alliance financial performance, a 
commonly used measure in the business-to-business relationship literature was used 
here (e.g., Hewett and Bearden 2001). Specifically, this measure captures market 
share, sales, return on assets (ROA), profit margin, and return on investment (ROI). 
Considering that objective alliance performance data is not readily available to 
academia, perceptual measures of alliance performance is a suitable option. Perceptual 
alliance performance measures are well accepted in strategic alliances research 
(Sarkar et al. 2001).   
 Alliance Strategic Performance. A measure from Sarkar et al. (2001) was utilized 
to capture the alliance strategic performance. Specifically, this perceptual measure 
captures the degree to which it is anticipated that strategic objectives of an alliance will 
be met. It is a 7-point Likert scale consisting of three items. Specifically, the items are 




partner firm; (2) collaborating with this alliance partner firm during the last year was a 
wise business decision; and (3) our strategic objectives set for this alliance for the year 
2014 were achieved.  
Measurement: Controls 
 
 Alliance Governance Mode. TCE suggests that the level of risk (i.e., opportunistic 
behavior) from transactional hazards depends on whether an alliance is a non-equity 
(i.e., market organization) or equity (i.e., hierarchy organization) based alliance. Alliance 
governance mode was operationalized as a binary variable, where non-equity alliances 
were coded with 0 and equity alliances were coded with 1. The data were collected from 
the SDC database.  
 Environmental Dynamism. The primary focus of this dissertation is to estimate 
how various relationship-related constructs affect opportunistic behaviors, because 
existing literature in strategic alliances offers still relatively limited research in this area. 
However, existing research is abundant on the topic of business environment and how it 
affects the structuring of alliances and behaviors of alliance partners. For this reason, 
environmental dynamism must be controlled for in this dissertation. Environmental 
dynamism is a composite measure of competitive intensity in the market (Ang 2008) 
and market uncertainty (Li et al. 2010).  
 To capture competitive intensity in the market, the formula offered by Ang (2008) 
was adapted here. First, a 4-digit SIC code for the alliance was obtained from the SDC 
database. Second, data regarding the market size within the industry (in terms of sales) 
was recorded. Third, data regarding the number of competitors within the 4-digit SIC 




were obtained from the First Research Mergent database. Fourth, competitive intensity 
was computed by dividing the market size by the number of competitors within the 
industry. Fiscal year 2014 was considered for this computation.   
 Market uncertainty is defined at time T as the standard deviation of the monthly 
return of the value-weighted industry i portfolio from time T-120 months to time T. Time 
T was set to January 1st, 2014 since this was the beginning of the fiscal year considered 
for the outcome measures. “Monthly stock return data are available for various 
industries from Kenneth French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/)”. An SIC code for the alliance 
was obtained from the SDC database and used to identify the correct industry for the 
monthly stock return data from Kenneth French’s website. This measure has been 
successfully applied in strategic alliances research. Li et al. (2010) used this measure of 
market uncertainty to capture external threats to strategic alliances. This measure offers 
a sense of a volatility in the market due to changing wants and needs of customers 
within that industry (Li et al. 2010; Robinson 2008). 
As mentioned previously, environmental dynamism is a composite score of the 
two dimensions. To create the composite score, both variables were first standardized 
since each utilizes a different scale. Z-scores were calculated for each variable and then 
added together to get at environmental dynamism.  
Appendix A presents the items used in a survey for Study 1 and Study 2 in a 







Hierarchical linear regression was used to analyze the hypotheses. As 
conceptual models become more complex, consisting of several direct effects of 
independent variables and possible interactions, it becomes difficult to assess which 
terms in the regression models drive the explanatory power of the model. However, as 
theory and practical considerations narrow down the list of variables and focus the 
conceptual model, hierarchical linear regression (HLR) can then be used to help identify 
which terms of the regression models make a significant statistical and practical 
contribution to the conceptual model. HLR is often used to compare successive 
regression models and to determine the significance that each of the terms introduced 
in any successive regression model has above and beyond the formal model. Each 
HLR model introduces a new set of regression terms in addition to the previous model 




CHAPTER IV: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter presents the analysis and results of the dissertation. The chapter is 
divided into two main sections, one detailing Study 1 and the other Study 2 analysis and 
results. In Study 1, sample characteristics are first presented followed by the 
measurement model. The measurement model sub-section checks for validity and 
reliability of each measure used in both studies. Lastly, the hypotheses’ tests and 
results are offered using hierarchical linear regression. In Study 2, the sample 
characteristics are presented first. Second, an endogeneity test of the relational factors 
variables is presented to check for a potential reverse causality concerns. Then, the 
hypotheses’ tests and results are offered using hierarchical linear regression.  
 
Study 1 Analysis 
Sample Characteristics 
 
 The data was collected through undergraduate student participation in a web-
based business simulation designed for supply chain management capstone business 
courses. The simulation exposed students to various aspects of managing strategic 
relationships with supply chain business partners. The strategic relationships consisted 
of suppliers and resellers. Each company, whether a supplier or a reseller, consisted on 
average of four students.  
 Students participating in the simulation were located at universities across the 
United States. Students who participated in the simulation during the fall 2014 and 




the objective performance data collected directly from the simulation, an online survey 
was created on a secure university-hosted Qualtrics server to capture the additional 
variables of interest as dictated by the conceptual model of this dissertation. Each 
company (i.e., student team) had a unique business name. Therefore, the survey was 
tailored to each class, such that it reflected a set of companies that existed within that 
class only. Each team was then asked to evaluate two strategic partner firms on a set of 
items that remained identical across all classes and universities. Students were asked 
to evaluate two strategic partner firms with which their firm interacted most often during 
the span of the simulation.  
 Two versions of the simulation were played by the students. The only difference 
between the two versions is the number of business quarters played by participants. 
Professors chose either four- or six-quarter simulations for their classes.  Professors 
were asked to introduce the survey to students shortly after the quarter prior to the last 
quarter was processed (i.e., either after quarter three in the four-quarter version or after 
quarter five in the six-quarter version). Depending on class schedule, this allowed 
students to take somewhere between 48 to 96 hours to complete the survey. Students 
were asked to complete the survey at least 6 hours prior to processing of the last 
quarter. This requirement was necessary to allow for distribution of the in-game 
simulation money reward. Each student who completed the survey was rewarded a 
certain amount of simulation money that would show up on the team’s income 
statement as “other income.” The amount awarded would depend on the size of the 
team, because the maximum amount per team was set to $200,000. For example, if the 




everyone within a company (a team) completed the survey, then an additional bonus of 
$50,000 was awarded to the company. Thus, the maximum potential reward equaled 
$250,000.  
 As an additional incentive to participate, professors and students were promised 
to receive relationship dashboards. Relationship dashboards were developed 
specifically for this dissertation to serve as an incentive, but also to potentially become a 
feature of the simulation that can be used in the future. A relationship dashboard is a 
one-page presentation of a company’s corporate image. The corporate image is an 
evaluation of a company by all of that company’s business partners. Professors 
welcomed this feature, and it helped to boost participation rate. An example of a 
relationship dashboard is presented in Appendix B.  
Out of the total of 228 students who participated in the simulation and who were 
asked to take the survey, 147 responded to the survey. This translates into a 64.47% 
response rate. The 147 respondents represented 73 companies. Each of the 
respondents was asked to evaluate two of their supply chain business partner firms with 
which their firm interacted most during the simulation. Some firms developed only one 
supply chain relationship throughout the simulation. In these cases, only one supply 
chain relationship was evaluated by the respondents. If more than one person per 
company evaluated the same supply chain relationship, then the individual responses 
were aggregated. This resulted in 134 relationship evaluations. The 134 evaluated 







Confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS version 20 was performed first to assess 
the measurement model fit statistics and the validity and reliability of the measures. A 
measurement model with all items was run initially. The initial CFA run did not offer 
satisfactory goodness-of-fit indices. Therefore, some measure purification was required. 
The initial CFA run indicated that the item Trust2R was loading poorly on its construct. 
Its loading was .408, which is below the desired standard of .7 (Garver and Mentzer 
1999). Examining wording of the item revealed weaknesses that, in addition to very 
poor loadings, justified elimination of the item from the measurement model. The item 
included the word “always” and is reverse coded. The word “always” is an example of 
an absolute statement, which should be avoided in survey research. Absolute 
statements are detrimental to Likert scales, because they force respondents to interpret 
these statements as a binary choice. Moreover, the reverse coding of this item could 
confound the problem of absolute statements. 
 After another CFA run, the item Rogue1 was deleted from the model for the 
following reasons. First, the item loading was below the generally accepted rule that all 
items should load on their respective constructs with loadings of .7 or above (Garver 
and Mentzer 1999). Second, the high regression weights modification indices identify 
Rogue1 as an item that cross-loads heavily with various constructs of the model. 
Primarily, this item was cross-loading with deviant-personal opportunism items. Upon 
examination of Rogue1 wording, the use of the phrase “partner” rather than “partner 
firm” may be interpreted as an individual rather than the strategically opportunistic move 




For very similar reasons, the items Monitoring2 and Trust3 were also deleted. 
The item loading was below the suggested .7 level for both of these items. In addition, 
the modification index for these items was greater than 10. Modification index is a 
measure of whether an item loads on multiple factors. A modification index coefficient 
value of 3.85 or greater indicates that the chi-square statistic can be statistically 
significantly reduced with the estimation of the coefficient. A more conservative 
approach, where the coefficient value of a modification index equal or is greater than 
10, would recommend an item for deletion (Fassinger 1987). Therefore, these items 
were deleted.  
At this stage, the CFA model indicated that the regression weight modification 
index for items Deviant3 and Identity4 was above acceptable level of 10 for more than 
one regression weight between the items and items from other constructs. Such 
significant cross-loadings call for a closer examination of the two items. Deviant3 item 
states “People responded in timely manner to our inquiries.” Just because a person 
does not respond in timely manner to someone’s inquiries, does not necessarily mean 
that they did so for opportunistic reasons. This item was likely misinterpreted by the 
survey respondents. Identity4 item states “If I had to make a choice between doing what 
was best for my firm or for the supply chain relationship with [partner name], I would do 
what was best for the relationship.” This relative alliance identity is the only item among 
the identity items that forces respondents to make a choice between their firm and the 
supply chain partner. It forces respondents into a survivor state of mind – its either us or 




At this point the confirmatory factor analysis produced satisfactory goodness-of-
fit indices. Specifically, CMIN/DF = 1.812, CFI = .941, IFI = .943, and RMSEA = .078. 
The CFA loadings are presented in Table 11.  
 















































































Construct validity is achieved when a construct corresponds to what its 
dimensions are supposed to measure (Peter 1981). Construct validity is assessed 
based on convergent and discriminant validity. A confirmation of the measures’ 
convergent validity is provided by the fact that average variance extracted (AVE) for 
each construct is above the .50 level (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Indeed, all constructs 




and Mentzer (1999) point out that researchers can be more certain that convergent 
validity was achieved when all factor loadings are above .70 level. All 24 items in the 
final measurement model have factor loadings above the .70 level.  
 
Table 12. Properties of Study 1 Constructs 
 
Construct Name AVE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Deviant-Personal Opportunism .791 .93 .21 .72 .34 .46 .46 .26 
2. Rogue-Firm Opportunism .783 .46** .91 .24 .05 .03 .10 .00 
3. Trust .849 -.85** -.49** .95 .32 .49 .43 .23 
4. Monitoring .697 -.59** -.24** .57** .86 .29 .19 .10 
5. Relative Alliance Identity .627 -.68** -.17* .70** .54** .87 .38 .39 
6. Organizational Proximity .785 -.68** -.33** .66** .44** .62** .91 .27 
7. Partner Independence .784 -.51** -.05 .48** .33** .63** .52** .90 
 
AVE:    Average variance extracted  
Diagonal:   Cronbach’s coefficient alpha  
Below diagonal:  Construct correlations  
    ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level 
Above diagonal:  Construct correlations squared  
 
 
 Discriminant validity is achieved when items from one construct do not correlate 
highly with items from another construct in the model. Measures’ discriminant validity 
exists when the average variance extracted for each of the constructs is greater than its 
shared variance with any of the other constructs in the measurement model. In other 
words, the AVE for each construct in any pair of constructs has to be larger than 
squared correlations between the two constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). This 







Once satisfactory measurement model fit with clear convergent and discriminant 
construct validity was established, scale reliability was assessed for all measures. 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach 1951) of .60 and above is accepted as an 
indication that the scale is reliable (Churchill 1979). Cronbach’s coefficient alpha across 
constructs ranged from .86 to .95.  
Common Method Bias 
 
Two tests were conducted to ensure common method bias (CMB) was not of 
concern in the data. First, Herman’s single factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff 
and Organ 1986) suggests running an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) while fixing the 
number of factors to one. If the one factor explains more than 50% of all variance, then 
CMB is a problem in the data. The test indicated that 49.70% of variance can be 
explained using one factor. This test does not indicate presence of common method 
bias; however, 49.70% is relatively close to the 50% mark. Therefore, another test was 
utilized to assure that CMB is not a problem in the data.  
The second test conducted was a common latent factor test. A common method 
latent variable (CMLV) was incorporated into the measurement model in AMOS. All 
observable items were then linked to the CMLV while also being linked to their intended 
constructs. All paths between the observable variables and CMLV were constrained to 
be equal. Constraining all paths to be equal results in regression paths with the same 
numerical result, allowing for a single number that accounts for common method bias 
(Gaskin 2011). This test is to show how much variance for all the items can be 




equals to .47, which equals to .2209 when squared. The common variance accounted 
for by this test is 22.09%. The common variance accounted for is significantly less than 
50%, which strongly rejects presents of common method bias (Gaskin 2011). In 
conclusion, both tests, Herman’s single factor test and the common latent factor test, 
conclude that common method bias is not of concern in the data. 
Nonresponse Bias Assessment 
 
 Nonresponse bias is not of concern in Study 1 due to the procedure used for 
survey administration. The supply chain simulation was used within a university 
classroom setting. Each simulation game consisted of either 4 or 6 quarters. Each 
sampled class was given anywhere between 3 to 7 days to make decisions prior to 
when the next quarter was run. The survey online link was introduced to students by 
their respective professors 48 to 72 hours prior to the last quarter being processed. 
Students were then given 42 to 66 hours to respond to the survey (up to 6 hours prior to 
the last quarter being processed). This short time window did not justify the use of the 
early and late responses technique for testing the nonresponse bias. Thanks to the 
simulation money incentive for participation, a higher response rate than reported by 
similar studies was achieved (64.47%). Thus, using the follow up by phone call 
technique was not justified either. Such a technique is appropriate under circumstances 







Study 1 Measurement Model Summary 
 
 In summary, the measurement model showed satisfactory results. The CFA 
process improved the measurement model and resulted in satisfactory overall 
goodness-of-fit statistics with CFI = .941, IFI = .943, RMSEA = .078, and CMIN/df ratio 
= 1.983. Convergent and divergent validity along with scale reliability showed 
acceptable values. Common method bias and nonresponse bias do not pose a threat to 
Study 1 data. 
Study 1 Hypotheses 
 
The testing of hypotheses was split into three sections. The first section tests 
hypotheses between the opportunistic behaviors and outcomes. The second section 
examines hypotheses between relational factors and opportunistic behaviors. The final 
third section tests hypotheses between alliance partner stability and relational factors. 
Study 1 Hypotheses: Opportunistic Behaviors and Outcomes 
 
 Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the 
method to test the hypotheses between opportunistic behaviors and outcomes. Next, 
analysis of each hypothesis is offered.  
Hypothesis 1 
 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that a negative relationship exists between rogue-firm 
opportunistic behaviors and alliance performance. Alliance performance was measured 
using two measures obtained directly from the objective simulation data: (a) partner’s 
return on assets (ROA) and (b) partner’s gross profit resulting from the focal 




income calculation before the ROA was calculated. Unstandardized beta coefficients 
are reported because the objective data allows for direct interpretation of the beta 
coefficients. In the case of ROA, the beta coefficient represents a percentage change in 
the ROA for each additional unit of rogue-firm opportunism. In the case of gross profit, 
the beta coefficient represents the gross profit dollar change for each additional unit of 
rogue-firm opportunism. With ROA as the dependent variable, a significant negative 
beta coefficient for rogue-firm opportunism (β = -10.44, p < .01) was found. With gross 
profit as the dependent variable, a significant negative beta coefficient for rogue-firm 
opportunism (β = -1,524,639, p < .10) was found. Thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b are 
supported. Table 13 presents the statistical information from the analysis.  
 
Table 13. Study 1: Rogue-Firm Opportunism and Alliance Performance 
 
  Partner’s ROA  Partner’s Relationship-
specific Gross Profit 
 H# β†  
% change 
t-value  β†  
$-value change  
t-value 
Controls       
UniverseID  -3.33 -1.11  -946,773 -1.54 
Universe Quarters  30.83** 2.21  4,384,806 1.50 
       
Linear Effects       
Rogue-Firm Opp. 
H1a -10.44*** -2.97    
H1b    -1,524,639** -1.96 
       
Intercept  82.01*** 3.81  17,109,465*** 3.49 
       
R2  .144   .105  
Adjusted R2  .125   .084  
R2 change  .055***   .026*  
F statistic   7.45***   5.08*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
†Unstandardized Beta coefficients are used here because they are more telling. They represent 






 Hypothesis 2 stated that a negative relationship exists between deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors and alliance performance. Performance outcome was measured 
using two measures obtained directly from the objective simulation data: (a) partner’s 
return on assets (ROA) and (b) partner’s gross profit resulting from the focal 
relationship. As with hypothesis 1, unstandardized beta coefficients are reported. With 
ROA as the dependent variable, a significant negative beta coefficient for deviant-
personal opportunism (β = -8.32, p < .01) was found.  With gross profit as the 
dependent variable, also a significant negative beta coefficient for deviant-personal 
opportunism (β = -4,030,706, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypotheses 2a and 2b are 
supported. For each additional unit of deviant-personal opportunism, partner’s ROA is 
lowered by 8.32% and partner’s gross profit resulting from the focal relationship is 
lowered by $4,030,706. Table 14 presents the statistical information from the analysis.  
 
Study 1 Hypotheses: Relational Factors and Opportunistic Behaviors 
 
 Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the 
method to test the hypotheses between relational factors and opportunistic behaviors. 
Next, an analysis of each hypothesis is offered.  
Hypothesis 3 
 
 Hypothesis 3 stated that monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated 




= -.24, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypothesis 3 is supported. Table 15 offers the 
statistical analysis summary. 
 
Table 14. Study 1: Deviant-Personal Opportunism and Alliance Performance 
 
  Partner’s ROA  Partner’s Relationship-
specific Gross Profit 
 H# β† 
% change 
t-value  β† 
$-value change 
t-value 
Controls       
UniverseID  -4.18 -1.37  -1,048,138* -1.80 
Universe Quarters  28.65** 2.01  5,941,481** 2.18 
       
Linear Effects       
Deviant-Personal Opp. 
H2a -8.32** -1.81    
H2b    -4,030,706*** -5.02 
       
Intercept  73.78*** 3.16  22,481,351*** 4.96 
       
R2  .112   .228  
Adjusted R2  .092   .210  
R2 change  .023**   .149***  
F statistic   5.43***   12.81*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
†Unstandardized Beta coefficients are used here because they are more telling. They represent 




Hypothesis 4 stated that monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated 
with rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.02, p = 








 Hypothesis 5 stated that trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship 
with deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. A squared trust term was constructed by 
mean centering the trust variable and then multiplying it by itself. Mean centering a 
variable helps with any potential multicollinearity problems (Hair et al. 2010). A 
significant beta coefficient (β = .20, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypothesis 5 is supported. 
The U-shaped results suggest that low and high levels of trust are associated with 
increased levels of deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors, while medium levels of 
trust are associated with the lowest levels of deviant-personal opportunism. Table 15 
offers the statistical analysis summary.  
Hypothesis 6 
 
 Hypothesis 6 stated that trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship 
with rogue-firm opportunistic behavior. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.04, p = 




Hypothesis 7 stated that relative alliance identity is negatively associated with 
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.08, p < 







Table 15. Study 1: Relational Factors and Deviant-Personal Opportunism 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 H# β t-value  β t-value  β t-value  β t-value 
Controls             
UniverseID  .01 .08  -.04 -.79  -.06 -1.03  -.06 -1.18 
Universe Quarters  .24* 2.14  .10* 1.84  .08 1.37  .09 1.61 
             
Linear Effects             
(T) Trust     -.67*** -10.66  -.57*** -7.49  -.56*** -7.30 
(M) Monitoring H3    -.16*** -2.94  -.18*** -3.23  -.24*** -3.92 
      RAI H7    -.10* -1.65  -.11* -1.86  -.08 -1.19 
             
Curvilinear Effects             
T2 H5       .13** 2.16  .20*** 2.98 
             
Interactions             
T x M H9          -.12** -2.16 
             
Intercept  2.30*** 5.12  7.56*** 20.68  7.20*** 18.23  7.28*** 18.61 
             
R2  .053   .774   .782   .789  
Adjusted R2  .038   .765   .771   .778  
R2 change     .721***   .008**   .008**  
F statistic   3.64*   87.50***   75.79***   67.51*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 








Table 16. Study 1: Relational Factors and Rogue-Firm Opportunism 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 H# β t-value  β t-value  β t-value  β t-value 
Controls             
UniverseID  .13 1.14  .09 .93  .09 .96  .09 .95 
Universe Quarters  .21* 1.95  .14 1.48  .15 1.53  .15 1.52 
             
Linear Effects             
(T) Trust     -.72*** -6.55  -.73*** -5.51  -.75*** -5.45 
(M) Monitoring H4    -.02 -.18  -.02 -.13  -.02 -.15 
      RAI H8    .35*** 3.31  .36*** 3.32  .36*** 3.19 
             
Curvilinear Effects             
T2 H6       -.04 -.39  -.04 -.30 
             
Interactions             
T x M H10          -.01 -.07 
             
Intercept  2.57*** 5.16  4.75*** 6.85  4.87*** 6.38  4.88*** 6.34 
             
R2  .028   .317   .318   .318  
Adjusted R2  .013   .291   .286   .280  
R2 change     .281***   .001   .000  
F statistic   1.90   11.90***   9.88***   8.40*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 






Hypothesis 8 stated that relative alliance identity is negatively associated with 
rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .36, p < 
.01) was found. Thus, the hypothesized relationship is statistically significant, but in the 
opposite direction. Hypothesis 8 is not supported in the hypothesized direction. Table 16 
offers the statistical analysis summary. 
Hypothesis 9 
 
Hypothesis 9 stated that the interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce 
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust and 
monitoring. To compute the interaction term, first both variables were mean centered. 
Mean centering a variable is just a simple algebraic transformation that helps with any 
possible multicollinearity concerns. After mean centering, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for each regression term was analyzed to assess multicollinearity. All VIFs were 
below 2, which is significantly below the recommended cutoff of 10 (Hair et al. 2010). 
Once there was no concern of multicollinearity, hierarchical linear regression was run 
with four models: (1) control variables only, (2) control variables and direct effects of 
relational factors, (3) controls, direct effects, and the curvilinear trust effect, and (4) 
controls, direct effects, curvilinear trust, and the two-way interaction between trust and 
monitoring. The full model 4 results indicate a statistically significant negative beta 
coefficient (β = -.12, p < .05) for the interaction between trust and monitoring. Thus, the 
hypothesis 9 is supported in the hypothesized direction. Table 15 offers the statistical 
analysis summary, and Figure 3 depicts the curvilinear interaction. To present the 




was split into low and high monitoring groups using the median split. Then, deviant-
personal opportunism was regressed on trust for the low monitoring cases only and 
then separately for the high monitoring cases. These two curves are overlapped on the 








Hypothesis 10 stated that the interaction between trust and monitoring will 
reduce rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust and 
monitoring. A similar approach to analyze the interaction and multicollinearity as for 
hypothesis 9 was applied here. VIFs always remained below the value of 2; thus, 




= n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 10 is not supported. Table 16 offers the statistical 
analysis summary. 
Study 1 Hypotheses: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors 
 
 Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the 
method to test the hypotheses between alliance partner stability and relational factors. 
Next, an analysis of each hypothesis is offered.  
Hypothesis 11 
 
Hypothesis 11 stated that alliance partner stability is negatively associated with 
monitoring. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .49, p < .01) was found. Thus, the 
hypothesized relationship is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction. 
Hypothesis 11 is not supported in the hypothesized direction. Table 17 offers the 
statistical analysis summary. 
Hypothesis 12 
 
Hypothesis 12 stated that alliance partner stability is positively associated with 
trust. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .68, p < .01) was found. Thus, 
hypothesis 12 is supported. Table 17 offers the statistical analysis summary. 
Hypothesis 13 
 
Hypothesis 13 stated that alliance partner stability is positively associated with 
relative alliance identity. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .62, p < .01) was 





The hypotheses, analysis results for Study 1, and corresponding analysis tables 
are all summarized in Table 18. 
 
Table 17. Study 1: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors 
 
Dependent Variable:  Monitoring  Trust  Relative Alliance 
Identity 
 H# β t-value  β t-value  β t-value 
Controls          
UniverseID  -.21** -2.16  -.08 -.97  -.02 -.21 
Universe Quarters  .05 .53  -.04 -.41  -.01 -.10 
          
Main Effects          
Alliance Partner Stability 
H11 .49*** 6.35       
H12    .68*** 10.10    
H13       .62*** 8.80 
          
Intercept  7.03*** 17.37  7.69*** 18.76  6.74*** 18.03 
          
R2  .255   .452   .387  
Adjusted R2  .238   .439   .373  
R2 change  .231***   .430***   .365***  
F statistic   14.84***   35.74***   27.33*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 




Table 18. Study 1: Hypotheses Results 
H# Hypothesis Result Table 
H1 Rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors are negatively associated with alliance 
performance. 
Supported 13 
H2 Deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors are negatively associated with alliance 
performance. 
Supported 14 
H3 Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors. 
Supported 15 
H4 Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with rogue-firm opportunistic 
behaviors. 
Not Supported 16 
H5 Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors.  
Supported 15 
H6 Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with rogue-firm opportunistic 
behaviors. 
Not Supported 16 
H7 Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with deviant-personal opportunistic 
behaviors. 
Not Supported 15 





H9 The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce deviant-personal opportunistic 
behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring. 
Supported 15 
H10 The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce rogue-firm opportunistic 
behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust or monitoring. 
Not Supported 16 
H11 Alliance partner stability is negatively associated with monitoring. Significant in 
opposite dir. 
17 
H12 Alliance partner stability is positively associated with trust. Supported 17 









SDC Platinum database served as the source for identifying US-based strategic 
alliances that also consisted of US-based partners only. Only alliances that started 
during the years 2010-2014 were considered for the sample with the additional 
requirement that they still be in existence on December 31st, 2014. For the criteria 
justification, refer to Chapter 3. This resulted in a total sample of 1,944 alliances, which 
meant 3,888 partner firms. From the 3,888 partner firms, it was possible to obtain 
contact information for 1,925 partner firms, which became the original sample size. The 
1,925 partner firms formed 1,055 unique alliances.  
Potential informants from this mailing list were contacted by an introductory 
email. Sending out the email revealed 306 contacts for which email addresses were 
invalid. The remainder of 1,619 contacts were contacted up to three times over the 
course of 6 weeks. Alliance partner contacts who opted-in by replying to the introductory 
or follow-up emails received an email with their unique Qualtrics survey link. The opted-
in participants were reminded to complete the survey. The introductory email, the follow-
up emails, and the reminder to complete the survey emails can be seen in Appendix C. 
From the 1,619 sample, 41 partner firms participated in more than one alliance in 
the sample. A decision was made to send only one survey to each contact due to the 
concern of overburdening respondents by sending them the same survey for two or 
more alliances in which they participated. Therefore, these 41 repetitive contacts were 




41 repetitive contacts, a randomization rule was established such that only the contact’s 
alliance that appeared first on the mailing list was used for surveying purposes. The 
mailing list was sorted by the alliance announcement date, such that the most recently 
announced alliance was at the very top of the list.  
From this usable sample of 1578 contacts, 162 contacts declined to participate in 
the survey primarily due to not having enough time on their schedule. From the same 
usable sample, 288 contacts agreed to participate and to complete the survey. From 
these 288 opted-in contacts, 183 completed responses were obtained. Therefore the 
usable contacts response rate is 11.60% (11.60% = (183 / 1,578) x 100), while the 
opted-in contacts response rate is 63.54% (63.54% = (183 / 288) x 100). Table 19 
presents the breakdown of original and completed samples per year when the alliance 
was started.  
Table 19. Breakdown of Original and Completed Samples Per Year 
 
Year Established Original Sample Completed Survey Sample 
2010 83 9 
2011 277 21 
2012 659 64 
2013 569 54 
2014 337 35 
Total 1925 183 
 
Out of the 183 completed responses, only 12 were from the same 6 alliances 
(i.e., 6 dyads). 52 of the 183 sample are publicly traded companies, and 131 are 
privately held. The companies vary in size from small to large enterprises. The majority 




firms come from a variety of industry sectors. The dominant industry sectors of the 
sample are business services (primarily management consulting and IT) and 
pharmaceuticals, followed by a range of other sectors, such as automotive, travel and 
leisure, education-related, oil, and real estate industries. A breakdown of respondents’ 
job titles, their company size (sales and number of employees), their company’s primary 
industry, and the company’s ownership status are presented in Table 20.  
Common Method Bias 
 
Herman’s single factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff and Organ 1986) 
was performed to test for common method bias. The test suggests running an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) while fixing the number of factors to one. If the one 
factor explains more than 50% of all variance, then CMB is a problem in the data. The 
test indicated that only 32.40% of variance could be explained using one factor. This 
test does not indicate presence of common method bias.    
Nonresponse Bias Assessment 
 
 Due to the potential threat of nonresponse bias in a survey research, mean 
differences across three waves of the survey responses were assessed (Armstrong and 
Overton 1977) for one randomly selected item from each survey construct – Rogue4, 
Deviant4, M6, Trust5, Identity3, Independence3, Proximity3, StrategicPerf3, and 
FinancialPerf4. A similar random selection approach was used by Gligor, Esmark, and 
Holcomb (2015). The one-way ANOVA analysis did not find any mean differences 
across the three waves. Therefore, it is fair to assume that no nonresponse bias exists 




Table 20. Sample Characteristics for Study 2 
 
Job Title % Annual Sales % Employees % Industry % Ownership % 
CEO 29% < 10 mil. 26% < 50 47% Business Serv. – Consult. 16% Public 29% 
President 26% 10 – 100 mil. 23% 50 - 99 6% Business Serv. – IT related 14% Private 71% 
VP 11% 100 mil. – 1 bil. 12% 100 - 499 11% Business Serv. – Other 10%   
Chairman 8% > 1 bil. 6% 500 - 999 3% Pharmaceuticals 11%   
GM 7%   > 1000 7% Healthcare Services 8%   
Founder 5%     Fun/Leisure/Entertainment 8%   
COO 5%     Banking/Finance/Insurance 7%   
CFO 2%     IT & Communications 5%   
CIO 2%     Real Estate 5%   
Chief Product 
Officer 
1%     Retail 4%   
Chief Strategy 
Officer 
1%     Manufacturing - General 3%   
Marketing 
Manager 
1%     Medical Equipment 3%   
      Manufacturing - Auto 2%   
      Utilities 1%   
















Table 21. Nonresponse Bias: One-way ANOVA Test 
































































































Table 22. Properties of Study 2 Constructs 
 
Construct Name 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Deviant-Personal Opportunism .80 .49 .53 .01 .00 .13 .05 .17 .22 
2. Rogue-Firm Opportunism .70** .81 .51 .00 .01 .13 .03 .13 .20 
3. Trust -.73** -.72** .93 .04 .01 .15 .14 .33 .46 
4. Monitoring -.12 -.09 .20** .78 .00 .01 .10 .03 .05 
5. Relative Alliance Identity -.03 -.10 .11 .04 .82 .01 .03 .00 .03 
6. Organizational Proximity -.37** -.36** .39** .11 .10 .86 .02 .09 .07 
7. Partner Independence -.24** -.19** .38** .32** .17* .13 .79 .15 .28 
8. Financial Performance -.41** -.37** .58** .19** .07 .30** .39** .93 .47 
9. Strategic Performance -.47** -.45** .68** .24** .18* .28** .53** .69** .82 
 
Diagonal:   Cronbach’s coefficient alpha  
Below diagonal:  Construct correlations  
   ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level 






Scale reliability was assessed for all measures. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
(Cronbach 1951) of .60 and above is accepted as an indication that the scale is reliable 
(Churchill 1979). Cronbach’s coefficient alpha across constructs ranged from .78 to .93. 
Cronbach’s alpha together with the correlation matrix are summarized in Table 22. 
Endogeneity Test 
 
 Before performing the actual hypothesis tests, the possibility of an endogeneity 
problem in relational factors variables must be addressed. An independent variable is 
labeled as endogenous when there is a significant correlation between the independent 
variable and the error term of the model (Wooldridge 2012). Endogeneity in 
independent variables can come from one of four sources: (1) errors-in-variables (i.e., 
measurement error), (2) autoregression, (3) omitted variables in theoretical models, or 
(4) it can be caused by simultaneous causality also known as reciprocal causality 
(Kennedy 2008). Points (1) and (2) are not so relevant to this study. More relevant to 
this study are points (3) and (4). In the social sciences, we do our best to eliminate the 
third source of endogeneity by introducing control variables into our models. However, 
no matter how much we try to control for all possible explanations of our dependent 
variables, there can always be something else, some spurious variable, which we failed 
to account for. While the third source of endogeneity can be addressed, at least to a 
certain degree, by control variables, eliminating the fourth source of endogeneity is not 




 In this dissertation’s theoretical model, the fourth source of endogeneity, 
reciprocal causality, is of most concern. It is argued here that relational factors (trust, 
monitoring, relative alliance identity) have an effect on opportunistic behaviors. For 
example, if there is trust among partners in an alliance, then the alliance partner is less 
likely to misbehave towards the focal partner firm. However, one could also make the 
argument that due to the presence of opportunistic behaviors in a strategic alliance, 
partners will not trust each other. This is what is known as simultaneous causation. The 
backward causal link, if present in the data, can produce biased OLS estimators.  
Assume the following simple regression equation: 
y = β0 + β1x + u 
In order to obtain an unbiased and efficient OLS β1 estimator, it must be true that x is an 
exogenous variable. In other words, there cannot be another variable that explains both 
x and y in the equation or that potentially causes the backward causality. If x is not 
exogeneous, then x is endogenous and we would have to assume that: 
Cov(x,u) ≠ 0 
 This coviariate between x and the error term u is what ultimately causes the 
endogeneity problem. To test whether such a covariate exists in the model’s regression 
equations, a commonly used test is introduced in the analysis, called the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (Hui et al. 2013; Semadeni, Withers, and Certo 2014; Wooldridge 2012). 
Ultimately, this test compares OLS estimators and 2SLS estimators and determines 
whether there are statistically significant differences between the two. If statistically 
significant differences exist, then it can be concluded that endogeneity is indeed a 




estimators. However, 2SLS estimators are less efficient than OLS estimators when the 
explanatory (independent) variable is exogenous, because 2SLS estimators have larger 
standard errors then OLS estimators (Wooldridge 2012). Therefore, if the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test determines that there are no statistically significant differences between 
the two estimators, then it can be concluded that the independent variable is not 
endogenous and, thus, the OLS estimators are more efficient than 2SLS. In this case, 
OLS estimators are more accurate and should be preferred over 2SLS estimators.  
 To be able to compute 2SLS estimators, first it is necessary to identify one or 
more suitable instrumental variables. A satisfactory instrumental variable, called z, is 
one that meets two conditions: 
1) Cov(z,x) ≠ 0. This simply means that instrumental variable z is related to x; i.e., it 
“is relevant for explaining variation in x … sometimes referred to as instrument 
relevance” (Wooldridge 2012). More relevant instrumental variables present 
stronger correlations with the potentially endogenous variable x (Kennedy 2008). 
2) Cov(z,u) = 0. This condition means that the instrumental variable z is exogenous 
in the simple regression equation provided earlier. Therefore, this criterion is 
often referred to as “instrument exogeneity” (Wooldridge 2012). This criterion 
refers to “the degree to which an instrument is uncorrelated with the disturbance 
term [error]” (Kennedy 2008).  
In practice it is often difficult to find an instrumental variable that satisfies both 
criteria above. This is due to the fact that “instrument relevance and exogeneity often 
work against one another” (Semadeni et al. 2014). For this reason, in practice often the 




compromise tends to be made against the second criterion, which proves to be more 
difficult to satisfy. It is often not satisfied because we do not know the true error terms in 
the simple regression presented above. Thus, researchers often substitute the second 
criterion with either (1) theoretical arguments that would suggest the instrumental 
variable is indeed an exogenous variable, (2) substituting Cov(z,u) = 0 with the second 
best alternative Cov(z,y) = 0, or (3) using both (1) and (2) to make an argument for 
instrument exogeneity (Semadeni et al. 2014).  
In summary, to test this dissertation’s independent variables (trust, monitoring, 
relative alliance identity) for endogeneity problems, three steps were followed:  
1) Satisfactory instrumental variables were identified.  
2) The instrumental variables were then used to compute 2SLS estimators. 
3) The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was run to determine whether endogeneity exists 
in the data. 
Candidates for instrumental variables came from the control variables used in 
this study and two new secondary data variables were collected for the purposes of the 
endogeneity test. These variables are referred to here as the environmental variables, 
because these variables represent the external business environment within which the 
sampled alliances operate. These variables are clearly exogenous to opportunistic 
behaviors, because these environmental variables were present before the alliance 
started to operate, hence supporting the second criterion (instrument exogeneity) of a 
satisfactory instrumental variable. To support the first criterion (instrument relevance), a 
correlation matrix between all environmental variables and relational factors was 




relevance. Moreover, to further support the theoretical argument made for the second 
criterion, opportunistic behaviors were included in the correlation matrix as well. The 
environmental variables with the smallest correlation with opportunistic behaviors would 
best support the second criterion. Therefore, to satisfy both the first and second 
criterion, for any of the environmental variables to be considered as a suitable 
instrumental variable candidate it would have to correlate with at least one of the 
relational factor variables and not correlate with opportunistic behaviors. Table 23 
presents environmental variables that were identified as suitable instrumental variables 
for each of the potentially endogenous relational factor variables.  
 
Table 23. Instrumental Variables Used for Endogeneity Test 
 
Relationship to be 
tested for 
endogeneity 
Instrumental Variable Criterion 1  
Cov(z,x) ≠ 0 
Criterion 2  
Cov(z,y) = 0 
Trust - Deviant Governance Mode  .16; p = .031 -.00; p = .990 
Trust - Rogue Market Uncertainty  .13; p = .070 -.08; p = .297 
Monitoring - Deviant Interpartner Competition -.14; p = .056  .04; p = .553 
Monitoring - Rogue Market Uncertainty  .18; p = .016 -.08; p = .297 
R.A. Identity - Deviant Alliance Inexperience  .11; p = .148 -.06; p = .458 
R.A. Identity - Rogue Alliance Inexperience  .11; p = .148  .04; p = .635 
Criterion 1: Cov(z,x) = Cov(Instrumental Variable, Trust/Monitoring/R.A. Identity) 
Criterion 2: Cov(z,y) = Cov(Instrumental Variable, Deviant-personal/Rogue-firm Opportunism) 
 
 
 Now that the instrumental variables were identified, 2SLS regression estimators 
were obtained and followed by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in STATA version 13. The 




estimators. Therefore, it can be concluded that endogeneity is not of concern in the 
data. The relevant statistics for each endogeneity test are provided in Table 24.  
 
Table 24. Endogeneity Test Results 
 




Trust - Deviant Governance Mode 2.48349 .1168 
Trust - Rogue Market Uncertainty .396324 .5298 
Monitoring - Deviant Interpartner Competition .096657 .7562 
Monitoring - Rogue Market Uncertainty .110916 .7395 
R.A. Identity - Deviant Alliance Inexperience .386986 .5347 
R.A. Identity - Rogue Alliance Inexperience .184617 .6679 
H0: the independent variable is exogenous.  
 
Study 2 Hypotheses  
 
 The testing of hypotheses was split into three sections. The first section tests 
hypotheses between the opportunistic behaviors and outcomes. The second section 
examines hypotheses between relational factors and opportunistic behaviors. The final 
(third) section tests hypotheses between alliance partner stability and relational factors. 
 
Study 2 Hypotheses: Opportunistic Behaviors and Outcomes 
 
 Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the 
method to test the hypotheses between opportunistic behaviors and outcomes. Next, 






 Hypothesis 1 stated that a negative relationship exists between rogue-firm 
opportunistic behaviors and alliance performance. Alliance performance was measured 
using two established measures: (a) financial performance and (b) strategic 
performance. With financial performance as the dependent variable, a significant 
negative beta coefficient for rogue-firm opportunism (β = -.36, p < .01) was found.  With 
strategic performance as the dependent variable, also a significant negative beta 
coefficient for rogue-firm opportunism (β = -.45, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypotheses 
1a and 1b are supported. Table 25 presents the statistical information from the analysis. 
 
Table 25. Study 2: Rogue-Firm Opportunism and Alliance Performance 
 




 H# β t-value  β t-value 
Controls       
Governance Mode  .06 .85  .01 .09 
Environmental Dynamism  .04 .58  .12* 1.84 
       




-.36*** -5.21    
H1
b 
   -.45*** -6.75 
       
Intercept  5.60*** 22.30  6.27*** 26.87*** 
       
R2  .144   .219  
Adjusted R2  .130   .206  
R2 change  .130***   .199***  
F statistic   10.04***   16.70*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 







 Hypothesis 2 stated that a negative relationship exists between deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors and alliance performance. Alliance performance was measured 
using two established measures: (a) financial performance and (b) strategic 
performance. With financial performance as the dependent variable, a significant 
negative beta coefficient for deviant-personal opportunism (β = -.41, p < .01) was found.  
With strategic performance as the dependent variable, also a significant negative beta 
coefficient for deviant-personal opportunism (β = -.47, p < .01) was found. Thus, 
hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported. Table 26 presents the statistical information from 
the analysis.  
 
Table 26. Study 2: Deviant-Personal Opportunism and Alliance Performance 
 




 H# β t-value  β t-value 
Controls       
Governance Mode  .10 1.45  .06 .84 
Environmental Dynamism  .02 .31  .10 1.51 
       
Linear Effects       
Deviant-Personal Opp. 
H2a -.41*** -6.12    
H2b    -.47*** -7.26 
       
Intercept  5.58*** 24.36  6.13*** 30.16 
       
R2  .185   .243  
Adjusted R2  .175   .230  
R2 change  .170***   .223***  
F statistic   13.52***   19.15*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 




Study 2 Hypotheses: Relational Factors and Opportunistic Behaviors  
 
 Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the 
method to test the hypotheses between relational factors and opportunistic behaviors. 
Next, analysis of each hypothesis is offered.  
Hypothesis 3 
 
 Hypothesis 3 stated that monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated 
with deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = .01, 




Hypothesis 4 stated that monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated 
with rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = .03, p = 




 Hypothesis 5 stated that trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship 
with deviant-personal opportunistic behavior. A squared trust term was constructed by 
mean centering the trust variable and then multiplying it by itself. Mean centering a 
variable helps with any potential multicollinearity problems (Hair et al. 2010). A 
significant beta coefficient (β = .57, p < .01) was found. Thus, hypothesis 5 is supported. 
Table 27 offers the statistical analysis summary, and Figure 4 depicts the curvilinear 




associated with increased levels of deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors, while 










Table 27. Study 2: Relational Factors and Deviant-Personal Opportunism 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 H# β t-value  β t-value  β t-value  β t-value 
Controls             
Governance Mode  -.03 -.37  .06 .89  .06 .98  .05 .97 
Environmental Dynamism  -.03 -.46  -.01 -.17  -.00 -.06  -.00 -.07 
             
Linear Effects             
(T) Trust     -.56*** -8.85  -.88*** -12.24  -.87*** 12.09 
(M) Monitoring H3    -.06 -.88  .01 .15  .01 .12 
      R.A.Identity H7    .07 1.05  .07 1.25  .07 1.27 
             
Curvilinear Effects             
T2 H5       .57*** 7.29  .57*** 7.17 
             
Interaction             
T x M H9          .02 .26 
             
Intercept  2.03*** 22.53  2.77*** 12.35  2.74*** 13.89  2.74*** 13.85 
             
R2  .002   .319   .477   .477  
Adjusted R2  -.009   .300   .359   .456  
R2 change     .317***   .158***   .000  
F statistic   .20   16.57***   26.72***   22.79*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 






 Hypothesis 6 stated that trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship 
with rogue-firm opportunistic behavior. A significant beta coefficient (β = .35, p < .01) 
was found. Thus, hypothesis 6 is supported. Table 28 offers the statistical analysis 
summary and Figure 5 depicts the curvilinear relationship. The U-shaped results 
suggest that low and high levels of trust are associated with increased levels of rogue-
firm opportunistic behaviors, while medium levels of trust are associated with the lowest 








Table 28. Study 2: Relational Factors and Rogue-Firm Opportunism 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 H# β t-value  β t-value  β t-value  β t-value 
Controls             
Governance Mode  -.14* -1.86  -.03 -.58  -.04 -.64  -.04 -.66 
Environmental Dynamism  -.01 -.19  .04 .63  .04 .75  .04 .72 
             
Linear Effects             
(T) Trust     -.65*** -11.28  -.91*** -11.63  -.90*** -11.47 
(M) Monitoring H4    -.01 -.09  .04 .64  .03 .57 
      RAI H8    -.02 -.43  -.02 -.42  -.02 -.36 
             
Curvilinear Effects             
T2 H6       .36*** 4.63  .35*** 4.53 
             
Interaction             
T x M H10          .02 .44 
             
Intercept  2.83*** 26.40  3.80*** 15.54  3.78*** 16.31  3.78*** 16.27 
             
R2  .019   .437   .498   .499  
Adjusted R2  .008   .421   .481   .478  
R2 change     .418***   .061***   .001  
F statistic   1.73   27.45***   29.09***   24.85*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 






Hypothesis 7 stated that relative alliance identity is negatively associated with 
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = .07, p = 




Hypothesis 8 stated that relative alliance identity is negatively associated with 
rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = -.02, p = n.s.) 




Hypothesis 9 stated that the interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce 
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust and 
monitoring. To compute the interaction term, both variables were first mean centered. 
Mean centering a variable is just a simple algebraic transformation that helps with any 
possible multicollinearity concerns. After mean centering, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for each regression term was analyzed to assess multicollinearity. All VIFs were 
below 2, which is significantly below the recommended cutoff of 10 (Hair et al. 2010). 
Once there was no concern of multicollinearity, hierarchical linear regression was run 
with four models: (1) control variables only, (2) control variables and direct effects of 
relational factors, (3) controls, direct effects, and the curvilinear trust effect, and (4) 




monitoring. The full model 4 results indicate a non-significant beta coefficient (β = .02, p 
= n.s.) for the interaction between trust and monitoring. Thus, hypothesis 9 is not 
supported. Table 27 offers the statistical analysis summary. 
Hypothesis 10 
 
Hypothesis 10 stated that the interaction between trust and monitoring will 
reduce rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct effects of trust and 
monitoring. A similar approach to analyze the interaction and multicollinearity to the one 
used for hypothesis 9 was applied here. VIFs remained below the value of 2; thus, 
multicollinearity is not present in the data. A non-significant beta coefficient (β = .02, p = 
n.s.) was found. Thus, hypothesis 10 is not supported. Table 28 offers the statistical 
analysis summary. 
Study 2 Hypotheses: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors 
 
 Hierarchical linear regression analysis in SPSS version 22 was chosen as the 
method to test the hypotheses between alliance partner stability and relational factors. 
Next, an analysis of each hypothesis is offered.  
Hypothesis 11 
 
Hypothesis 11 stated that alliance partner stability is negatively associated with 
monitoring. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .26, p < .01) was found. Thus, the 
hypothesized relationship is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction. 
Hypothesis 11 is not supported in the hypothesized direction. Table 29 offers the 






Hypothesis 12 stated that alliance partner stability is positively associated with 
trust. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .47, p < .01) was found. Thus, 
hypothesis 12 is supported. Table 29 offers the statistical analysis summary. 
Hypothesis 13 
 
Hypothesis 13 stated that alliance partner stability is positively associated with 
relative alliance identity. A significant positive beta coefficient (β = .16, p < .05) was 
found. Thus, hypothesis 13 is supported. Table 29 offers the statistical analysis 
summary. 
The hypotheses, analysis results, and corresponding analysis tables are all 
summarized in Table 30. 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
 
Some of the results in both Study 1 and 2 were contradictory to game theory. 
Specifically, the results for the hypotheses 11 in both studies were significant but in the 
opposite direction than hypothesized. The results suggested that in a stable alliance 
relationship there is a need to monitor alliance partners more extensively. This finding is 
contradictory to theory. 
The variable alliance partner stability was constructed as a composite variable 
that consisted of partner proximity and partner independence dimensions. This 
approach has been used in studies considering external market stability, but not in 
studies examining internal alliance partner stability. Therefore, to assure that the 




regressions were run with the two dimensions (partner independence and partner 
proximity) as separate variables rather than as dimensions of alliance partner stability 
variable. The results of these regressions analysis are presented in Table 31 (Study 1) 
and Table 32 (Study 2).  
To perform the analysis each of the hypotheses H11-13 was split into part “a” 
and part “b”, representing partner independence and partner proximity respectively. The 
results indicated that the beta coefficients for each variable and hypotheses remain 
positive; thus, confirming the composite variable results. Moreover, the results indicated 
that in Study 1 it is predominantly the partner proximity that offers more significant 
results, while in Study 2 it is predominantly the partner independence that offers more 
significant results. Perhaps the sample utilized in each study explains the differences. 
The student sample in Study 1, may see partner’s similarities when it comes to running 
a business and interacting with business partners as more important. University 
students often rely on social cues when it comes to establishing relationships. The 
business professionals sample in Study 2 may view independence from their partner as 
a more indicative aspect of stable relationship conditions than cultural proximity 
between the two firms. This difference may also stem from the use of simulation versus 
real money. It may be more salient that a firm’s bottom line will be affected by a partner 
who wields more power in an alliance than by a partner who has different organizational 
culture. This point has been expressed by one of the respondents to the survey in Study 
2. He commented in an open text box at the end of the survey as follows. 
Our alliance is with a huge corporation and we are a small break-even 




will not be affected if the alliance fails. Have a huge partner is good, but getting 
their attention and focus is very difficult. Lately, things are improving. 
In this specific strategic alliance, a large and established partner knowingly 
dictates the rules of the partnership. The smaller partner is dependent on the larger 
power wielding partner. Similar imbalance of power was expressed by other 
respondents. For example, 
We are a small high tech company that has had alliances with several 
major U.S. corporations.  In each case the large corps eventually took extreme 
advantage of the relationship to the detriment of our organization.  Promises 
were made via contracts or through top management assurances that were 
purposely violated at some point in the relationship after they had the technical 
knowledge or advantage they desired from the relationship.  One organization 
copied confidential info secretly and then tried to put us out of business after they 
copied and learned from us. Another blatantly breached a very large contract 
worth 10's of millions that we had to fight legally, and a third squeezed us out for 
a fraction of the return they promised in the relationship when they knew we 
needed money during the downturn. 
In accordance with the results, partner independence is often key to establishing 




Table 29. Study 2: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors 
Dependent Variable:  Monitoring  Trust  Relative Alliance 
Identity 
 
 H# β t-value  β t-value  β t-value  
Controls           
Governance Mode  -.02 -.31  .06 .92  .08 1.02  
Environmental Dynamism  .08 1.17  -.01 -.21  .01 .04  
           
Main Effects           
Alliance Partner Stability 
H11 .26*** 3.63        
H12    .47*** 7.08     
H13       .16** 2.12  
           
Intercept  3.41*** 15.01  4.18*** 22.79  1.90*** 8.90  
           
R2  .081   .233   .035   
Adjusted R2  .065   .220   .019   
R2 change  .068***   .215***   .024**   
F statistic   5.24***   18.16***   2.15*  
*p < .10 
**p < .05 









Table 30. Study 1 and 2: Hypotheses Results 










H1 Rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors are negatively associated 
with alliance performance. 
Supported 13 Supported 25 Supported 
H2 Deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors are negatively 
associated with alliance performance. 
Supported 14 Supported 26 Supported 
H3 Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with 
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors. 




H4 Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with rogue-







H5 Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with 
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors.  
Supported 15 Supported 27 Supported 
H6 Trust in alliance partners has a U-shaped relationship with 
rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. 
Not 
Supported 
16 Supported 28 Partial 
Support 
H7 Relative alliance identity is negatively associated with deviant-















H9 The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce 
deviant-personal opportunistic behaviors beyond the direct 
effects of trust or monitoring. 




H10 The interaction between trust and monitoring will reduce rogue-












17 Significant in 
opposite dir. 
29 Significant in 
opposite dir. 
H12 Alliance partner stability is positively associated with trust. Supported 17 Supported 29 Supported 
H13 Alliance partner stability is positively associated with relative 
alliance identity. 






Table 31. Study 1: Partner Independence, Proximity and Relational Factors 
 
Dependent Variable:  Monitoring  Trust  Relative Alliance 
Identity 
 H# β t-value  β t-value  β t-value 
Controls          
UniverseID  -.24 -2.46  -.12 -1.40  -.10 -1.19 
Universe Quarters  .03 .30  -.06 -.74  -.07 -.84 
          
Main Effects          
Partner Independence H11a .17* 1.89       
Partner Proximity H11b .41*** 4.49       
Partner Independence H12a    .20** 2.62    
Partner Proximity H12b    .57*** 7.45    
Partner Independence H13a       .43*** 5.87 
Partner Proximity H13b       .39*** 5.37 
          
Intercept  6.24*** 10.73  6.68*** 11.98  4.85*** 10.47 
          
R2  .275   .480   .516  
Adjusted R2  .253   .463   .501  
R2 change  .251***   .458***   .494***  
F statistic   12.24***   29.72***   34.36*** 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 





















Table 32. Study 2: Partner Independence, Proximity and Relational Factors 
 
Dependent Variable:  Monitoring  Trust  Relative Alliance 
Identity 
 H# β t-value  β t-value  β t-value 
Controls          
Governance Mode  -.02 -.26  .06 .91  .08 1.03 
Environm. Dynamism  .05 .62  -.03 -.44  -.01 -.19 
          
Main Effects          
Partner Independence H11a .30*** 4.13       
Partner Proximity H11b .08 1.10       
Partner Independence H12a    .34*** 5.16    
Partner Proximity H12b    .34*** 5.29    
Partner Independence H13a       .16** 2.09 
Partner Proximity H13b       .07 .93 
          
Intercept  2.43*** 5.73  2.72*** 8.02  1.37*** 3.39 
          
R2  .112   .275   .042  
Adjusted R2  .092   .259   .021  
R2 change  .099***   .256***   .032*  
F statistic   5.61***   16.89***   1.96 
*p < .10 
**p < .05 




CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS 
 
  
 While Chapter 4 offered detailed statistical analysis and results of the 
hypothesized relationships, this chapter discusses the results in connection to strategic 
alliances literature and game theory. Furthermore, the discussion offered in this chapter 
outlines possible reasons why some of the unexpected but intriguing results occurred. 
Following the discussion of the results, theoretical and managerial implications are 
outlined, limitations to the research are pointed out, opportunities for future research are 
explored, and concluding remarks close this research.  
Discussion 
 
 The primary purpose of this research was to empirically test how relational 
factors influence two types of opportunistic behaviors in strategic alliance relationships. 
Opportunistic behavior is often explored in interfirm relationships research, yet we don’t 
know the different types of behavior that are hidden behind the general opportunism 
label (Seggie, Griffith, and Jap 2013; Wathne and Heide 2000). Therefore, using game 
theory as guidance, this dissertation examined relational factors and their influence on 
two types of opportunistic behaviors in strategic alliances. This research differentiated 
between deviant-personal (individual-level) and rogue-firm (firm-level) opportunistic 
behaviors. Relational factors considered in this dissertation were trust, monitoring, and 
relative alliance identity.  
 The hypothesized relationships were tested across two studies. Study 1 utilized a 
behavioral business simulation to collect objective secondary data in addition to primary 




buyers and sellers within a simulated microcomputers industry. While these alliances 
were ongoing, the parties were aware of the termination date from the beginning of the 
relationship. Study 2 sampled business executives who served as key informants for 
their respective strategic alliances. The sample was obtained from the SDC Platinum 
database. The study relied on a survey data collection and some secondary data that 
were also obtained from the SDC Platinum database. The study investigated ongoing 
strategic alliances without a known termination date.  
 In general, there is some support for the hypothesized relationships. However, 
some of the hypothesized relationships were significant, but in the opposite direction, 
while others were not supported. The overall results warrant differentiation between the 
two types of opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore, out of the relational factors explored 
here, trust appears to be the key driver to minimizing opportunism, especially deviant-
personal opportunism. Most interestingly, it does so in a non-linear way.  Lastly, the 
stability between alliance partners plays a significant role in explaining the relational 
factors. To help with understanding the discussion presented below, please refer to 
Table 30 at the end of Chapter 4 for a presentation of the hypotheses and results 
across both studies.      
Discussion: Opportunism and Alliance Performance 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
 Without any doubt, hypotheses 1 and 2 clearly indicate that no matter what type 
of opportunistic behavior is considered, such a misbehavior will always have a negative 




partner is perceived as being opportunistic (deviant-personal and rogue-firm), their 
objective ROA and gross profit generated from the focal relationship is significantly 
lower. Study 2 revealed that when the focal firm perceives an alliance partner as being 
opportunistic (deviant-personal and rogue-firm), then the focal firm’s performance 
declines. Together, these results suggest that when a firm in an alliance is viewed as 
opportunistic, it does not only hurt their partner’s performance, but it hurts their own firm 
as well. Moreover, it is not only the perception of the firm being opportunistic in a 
strategic manner, but arguably and more importantly, it is the perception that certain 
individuals from the partner firm are misbehaving that causes performance problems for 
both alliance partners.  
Discussion: Relational Factors and Opportunism 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 
 
Monitoring alliance partners is negatively associated with deviant-personal 
opportunistic behavior in Study 1 but not in Study 2. Therefore, there is partial support. 
The game theory literature has a clear explanation for this discrepancy across the two 
studies. All involved parties in Study 1 know that at the latest the relationship will end 
when the simulation ends. Study 2 examines relationships that are ongoing, and the 
end date of the relationship is not known. Experimental game theory suggests that in 
games with a known end, partners require more monitoring than games with an 
unknown end to assure continuous cooperation and to minimize misbehaviors. The end-




Furthermore, it is interesting that in both studies monitoring is not significantly 
associated with rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors. This finding, or the lack of a 
significant finding, further strengthens the point made earlier in this chapter’s discussion 
that monitoring behaviors of individuals may be more revealing than simply monitoring 
the strategic behavior of the partner-firm as a whole. Observing and managing how the 
counterparts from the partner-firm behave towards the focal firm’s employees may be 
more fruitful to the positive outcomes of the alliance, especially when the end of the 
relationship is approaching and known. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 
 
The results offered in this dissertation show strong support for the hypothesized 
curvilinear relationship between trust and deviant-personal opportunistic behavior 
across both studies. This finding provides evidence that when trust is not present 
between alliance partners, opportunistic behaviors are more likely to occur. 
Furthermore, the curvilinear relationship suggests that, initially, trusting an alliance 
partner helps to lower opportunistic behaviors, but it helps only at a diminishing rate. At 
a certain point, too much trust actually becomes counterproductive. Too much trust 
invites alliance partners to misbehave, again.    
In the extant interfirm relationship literature, trust is seen as the key ingredient 
behind a successful business relationship. The negative linear relationship between 
trust and opportunism over the years has become a law-like proposition. However, more 
recent literature has started to question this proposition. First of all, the concept of trust 
is a part of the relationship metaphor that is dangerously too often applied to interfirm 




and obscure experiences of the parties to the interfirm relationship (Blocker, Houston, 
and Flint 2012). The desire for relational bonds in interfirm dealings can become a 
catalyst for the “dark side” of trust. Anecdotal evidence of the “dark side” of trust is 
present in the literature (Anderson and Jap 2005; Atuahene-Gima and Li 2002; 
Gundlach and Cannon 2010) but has not been empirically proven until this dissertation.  
Study 2 results also show strong support for the curvilinear relationship between 
trust and rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors, but this finding is not supported in Study 1. 
With this said, the non-hypothesized negative linear effect between trust and both types 
of opportunistic behaviors is strongly significant across both studies. Perhaps the 
curvilinear relationship between trust and rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors did not 
show significant results in Study 1 due to the fact that the relationships in the simulation 
are shorter lived than the relationships from the real business world in Study 2. One’s 
true motive behind establishing trust with others may need more time to transpire.  
Hypotheses 7 and 8 
 
The relationship between relative alliance identity and opportunistic behaviors is 
mostly not supported across the two studies, except for rogue-firm opportunistic 
behaviors in Study 1. There, the hypothesized relationship is significant in the opposite 
direction. The significance in the opposite direction is interesting to explore. It might 
suggest that firms that identify more with their partners perceive partners’ behaviors with 
a more critical eye. What otherwise, under low relative alliance identity, would be 
perceived as an acceptable behavior, is perceived as a more serious misbehavior under 
high relative alliance identity. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive to theory. The 




one hand, game theory and social identity theory suggest that highly identified parties 
will enjoy a more cooperative environment. In other words, less opportunistic behavior 
will be present in such relationships. However, what little misbehavior presents itself 
may be viewed more harshly by a party that highly identifies with the offender.  
Hypotheses 9 and 10 
 
The interaction between trust and monitoring and its impact on deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors is supported in Study 1. It is not supported in Study 2 and it is 
not supported for rogue-firm opportunistic behaviors across both studies.  
These findings suggests two points. First, in Study 1 a significant result was 
found for the influence of the interaction on deviant-personal opportunism but no 
significance was found for the rogue-firm opportunism. This again illustrates the point 
that strategic alliances literature cannot ignore individual level opportunistic behaviors. 
Focusing on firm-level opportunism has offered valuable insights; however, more can be 
learned by shifting focus to deviant-personal opportunism.  
Second, a more interesting finding, is the way the significant interaction behaves 
in Study 1 (refer to Figure 3 on p.113 in Chapter 4). The interaction suggests that 
having monitoring mechanisms in place is always more beneficial to minimizing deviant-
personal opportunism than not having monitoring mechanisms. This is especially true 
under high levels of trust. Looking at the graph’s low monitoring solid curve, one can 
see that eventually trust becomes misused in the simulation setting. Hence, the solid 
curve uptick at high levels of trust. Only when partners monitor their counterparts they 
do not fall prey to trusting their partners too much. Hence, the dashed curve does not 




 Game theory offers an interesting explanation for this finding. In Study 1, a 
sample of undergraduate students was surveyed. They engaged in a simulation of 
strategic interfirm relationships with a known end. Game theory suggests that strategic 
decisions in a partnership change as the likelihood of the end of the partnership 
increases (Normann and Wallace 2012). These strategic decisions change even further 
as the partnership termination date becomes known (Warnick and Slonin 2004). The 
end-game strategies change such that partners often choose to act opportunistically to 
gain as much economic rent as possible out of the partnership before it ends. Having 
monitoring mechanisms in place can bring more certainty into a relationship with a 
known termination date, especially under high trust conditions. Monitoring mechanisms 
act as a counterbalance to alliance partner employees’ exposure due to increased 
levels of trust that was established with their counterparts from the other alliance partner 
firm. Game theory suggests that such end-game strategies are usually not as evident in 
ongoing partnerships where the termination date is not determined, which would point to 
the not-significant interaction in Study 2. In Study 2, sample of ongoing strategic 
alliances was surveyed, where the relationship end date is not known.  
In summary, when the end to a strategic alliance is known, relying solely on high 
trust in your partner, may have detrimental result for the focal firm. Establishing 
monitoring mechanisms in such a situation can at least signal to the focal firm 
employees that their high trust in their counterparts is being abused and appropriate 





Discussion: Alliance Partner Stability and Relational Factors 
Hypotheses 11, 12, and 13 
 
 Hypothesis 11 introduced the negative relationship between alliance partner 
stability and monitoring. The relationship is significant across the two studies but in an 
opposite direction. Stability between partners may make the partners complacent and 
unworried, thus making them vulnerable to attacks. Hence, the results show a positive 
relationship where more stability translates into more monitoring of partners. More 
monitoring acts as a countermeasure to complacent conditions. It can be viewed as the 
silence before the storm situation. Silence, or stability, may be suspicious and, thus, 
more monitoring is needed to reassure oneself that all is well and sound. If no 
monitoring mechanisms are in place, the storm may come as a surprise and destroy 
any value that was built as a result of the alliance.  
 The last two hypotheses, hypotheses 12 and 13, predicted that stable conditions 
translate into more trust and higher levels of relative alliance identity. These results are 
in line with game theory and social identity theory. When alliance partners’ cultures are 
similar and the partnership operates on an equal basis, then it is easier to know and 
trust the other partner of the alliance. Moreover, under such conditions employees from 
both partner-firms can more easily identify with their counterparts since they share a 




Several interesting theoretical implications can be drawn from this research. First 




rogue-firm opportunism was considered. Existing strategic alliance literature does not 
explore deviant-personal opportunism. Future research in strategic alliances can gain 
new insights by re-conceptualizing opportunism at the individual level. Such 
conceptualization of opportunism is likely to bring additional explanatory power to 
studies about strategic alliances. Moreover, the relationship metaphor used in interfirm 
literature originates from interpersonal relationships. Therefore, if scholars are to use 
the relationship metaphor to study interfirm phenomena, then it may be more 
appropriate to operationalize measures used for such research at the individual level.  
To this date, the interfirm relationship literature has empirically tested only the 
linear hypothesis that more trust always improves the relationship and its outcomes. 
However, more recent literature offers anecdotal and some qualitative research 
evidence that too much trust can be detrimental to a successful strategic alliance. This 
research clearly proves empirically that indeed that is the case. The theories applied in 
interfirm literature should reevaluate hypothesized relationships between trust and other 
constructs of interest. Linear relationships offer only a limited understanding of trust. 
Going beyond linear relationships offers a more telling and complete picture.   
This research offers an intriguing finding when it comes to parties who highly 
identify with each other. Alliance partners that identify with each other exhibited a higher 
perception of opportunistic behaviors of their partners. This finding contrasts with what 
game theory and social identity suggest. Specifically, the finding suggests that there 
may be a dual purpose to creating teams where members highly identify with each 
other. Such identification lowers the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors occurring and 




highly identified alliance teams may perceive even a miniscule act of opportunism as a 
strong offense. Future research needs to explore this explanation in more detail.  
The interactive effect of trust and monitoring on deviant-personal opportunism is 
not necessarily the same under all conditions. In the case where research focuses on 
ongoing interfirm relationships with a known termination date, having monitoring 
mechanisms present is overall always beneficial, but it is more beneficial under high 
trust than under low trust conditions. Theories and studies incorporating this interactive 
term into their models should carefully evaluate their population of interest.  
In general, stability between alliance partners has a positive effect on the 
partnership. It promotes trust and the sense of identity between the partners. 
Unexpectedly, it also increases the need to monitor partners. This is counter to game 
theory and to transaction cost economics theory.  
Managerial 
 
While strategic alignment may be in sync across alliance partner firms’ 
management, not managing alliance personnel at the operational level may translate to 
perceptions of employees from the partner firm as acting opportunistically, which 
consequently lowers the performance of both partners. In other words, a strategic 
alliance management team should not only focus on metrics that manage and monitor 
the partner-firm, but should also strive to develop metrics of relational factors between 
the two partner-firms’ personnel. Understanding how the boundary spanners from both 
firms interact and behave towards each other can improve overall perceptions of how 




Strategic alliance management teams, but more importantly the boundary 
spanners from each partner-firm, should develop trust-based relationships but at the 
same time should be wary of their counterparts from the partner-firm. Trust can be 
misused. Incorporating discussions about personnel’s relationships with their 
counterparts at a partner-firm into periodic performance reviews may be a way to offer 
balance-checks for the personnel. These balance-checks could help strategic alliance 
personnel to develop healthy relationships with their counterparts without falling prey to 
the dark side of trust-based relationships. For example, one respondent expressed that 
it is the relationships among people that determine how successful an alliance will 
become.  
It is probably obvious but the longer a particular relationship is in place the 
more management changes the relationship experiences.  These changes can 
be positive or negative and so the longer the relationship the more ebb and flow 
each party experiences.  While contracts cover the Ts and Cs, in my experience 
it is always about the relationship between people that make these work or not.     
Empowering alliance employees with techniques that allow them to monitor and 
evaluate their relationships might be one way to deal with the potentially damaging 
trust-based relationships. The results of this dissertation indicate that having monitoring 
programs in place can not only prevent opportunistic behaviors, but also prevent 
employees from trusting their counterparts from the alliance partner firm. Various IT 
systems already exist that allow management to monitor the performance of their 




relationships with their counterparts can be beneficial to maintaining healthy levels of 
trust and to keep deviant-personal opportunism under control.  
A big topic among the strategic alliance leaders is this idea of how much sense of 
unity (i.e., identity) should be created among alliance employees who come together 
from often differing organizational cultures. This discussion stems from the fact that 
alliances lay in between arm’s length relationships and mergers and acquisition. In 
arm’s length relationships, partners don’t have the need to create a sense of identity. In 
mergers and acquisitions, it is a major challenge to completely unify two organizational 
cultures. Often, this process causes organizational restructuring. Alliances fall in the 
middle. Alliances between two firms are the majority of times formed for certain period 
of time. Employees assigned to the alliance may feel a loss of identity. Corporate 
initiatives that help these employees to build a new sense of identity do a great job. 
However, they are not effective at minimizing the possibility of employees going native 
so to speak. In other words, they don’t focus on pulling the employees back to their 
original firm once the alliance has ended. This research suggests that building a sense 
of identity can also introduce a heightened level of sensitivity among employees when it 
comes to evaluating opportunistic acts of other alliance employees. This dimension 
should not be undermined as it can create tensions that potentially could be worse than 
the opportunistic acts themselves. 
When entering a strategic alliance with a new business partner, it is important to 
evaluate whether stable conditions can exist between the two firms. Lack of stability can 




build a sense of identity among themselves, and how much monitoring will be required 
to assure a healthy relationship.   
Limitations 
 
 As with any study, this research is not without its limitations. Clearly, the cross-
sectional research design limits the extent to which causal relationships can be inferred. 
Longitudinal data would be of great interest here. In phenomena that mimic prisoner’s 
dilemma settings, strategic decisions are made across rounds of decisions. Often 
strategic alliance partners make strategic decisions based on their partner’s strategic 
move from the last round of decisions. While obtaining longitudinal data continues to be 
a challenge in strategic alliance literature, the benefits of pursuing it are enormous.  
 Another limitation of this research, specifically applicable to Study 2, is the 
collection of perceptual performance data through a survey. Even in the case of publicly 
traded companies which are required to produce financial statements to their 
stakeholders, obtaining performance data solely as a result of a specific strategic 
alliance remains a challenge for researchers. Moreover, employees from both privately-
held and publicly-traded companies are often unable to share any information, yet alone 
the performance data, due to non-circumvention/non-disclosure (NCND) agreements 
that they sign with their employers. This is where Study 1 and its use of the simulated 
business setting comes to be very useful. If researchers cannot obtain objective 
performance data from actual strategic alliances, then obtaining objective performance 
data from simulated business environments is the second-best alternative.  
 While this research tests for endogeneity problems in its data, the test of 




variables introduced to the test. While the instrumental variables introduced in this 
research meet the endogeneity test criteria, one could always make an argument that 
yet better instrumental variables may exist out there. Longitudinal data yet again could 
be beneficial to solving endogeneity concerns.    
 The measure of deviant-personal opportunism is a new measure created for the 
purposes of this dissertation. It has been adapted based on an existing opportunism 
measure. The adaptation required significant changes. While the measurement model 
demonstrated that the measure meets validity and reliability criteria, it still may be 
beneficial for future research to go through more detailed scale development process. 
The scale development process is likely to further improve the measure and, 
consequently, the accuracy of future research findings. 
Future Research 
 
Future research opportunities exist that can enhance our understanding of the 
phenomena and theoretical relationships explored in this dissertation. Future studies of 
strategic alliances should take extra care to collect data that indicate to the researchers 
whether the alliance surveyed has a termination date in place. End game strategies can 
make a difference in partners’ relational values and behavior.  
While this research has not attempted to test a multi-level model, one may also 
view the use of deviant-personal (individual) and rogue-firm (firm) level analysis of 
opportunistic behavior in a single conceptual model as problematic. It could be 
beneficial to our understanding of opportunism if the deviant-personal opportunism was 




strategic alliances, since the introduction of deviant-personal opportunism into this 
literature stream is offered by this dissertation.  
Great research opportunities exist for interfirm relationships scholars in simulated 
business environments. Business simulations have evolved a great deal over the years. 
These simulations no longer are linear in their plot and are more interactive in nature. 
Their environments become more complex and mimic real business world scenarios 
very closely. The data that can be collected through simulated business environments 
can be more telling and more objective than survey data or arguably even than 
secondary data from actual interfirm relationships. Secondary databases are often not 
kept up to date, and their variable definitions change, which poses a risk to researchers.  
 The interactive term between trust and monitoring and its impact on deviant-
personal opportunism is an interesting topic that a future study could explore further. As 
mentioned earlier, game theory suggests that monitoring mechanisms are likely to be 
more valuable in trusting relationships when the end of the relationship is known. On the 
other hand, game theory suggests that having monitoring mechanisms present when 
the end of the relationship is not on an immediate horizon can actually harm the trusting 
relationship and ultimately cause more opportunistic behaviors. While this theoretical 
argument was not explicitly tested a priori in this dissertation, the hypothesis 9 findings 
in this dissertation land some support to it. Future study could do two things to better 
understand this interaction. A single environment could be used to explore the 
differences between known versus not known strategic alliance horizons. A business 
simulation may serve as an excellent environment for this purpose. Second, the future 




outcome-based monitoring (Gundlach and Cannon 2010) and goodwill and competence 
trust (Das and Teng 2001) and how the interactions among these types of monitoring 
and trust affect deviant-personal opportunism under the different horizon rules.  
 Another study utilizing the business simulation can focus on collecting and 
analyzing dyadic data. One of the major limitations in the strategic alliance literature 
stems from the use of cross-sectional data and the lack of the use of dyadic data. This 
limitation is accepted due to the difficulty obtaining dyadic data in this research stream. 
The simulation used here is capable of generating a sample of supplier-buyer dyads 
with objective performance data. Dyadic data has the potential to offer a fuller picture of 
any studied phenomenon in the interfirm relationships literature. For example, exploring 
how both parties to a relationship perceive each other when it comes to deviant-
personal opportunism could offer additional insights. Moreover, exploring these dyads 
longitudinally, across the business quarters played out in this simulation, could offer 
insight into how perception of opportunism builds up over time. Finding a tipping point at 
which alliance partners will find opportunistic acts by a partner as a direct threat and 
exploring possible correcting mechanisms that can help partners reverse the course of 
perceived opportunistic acts would be valuable to theory and practice.  
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, this dissertation offers a fresh look at opportunistic behaviors in 
strategic alliances. When studying relational factors and how they affect opportunism, 
more insightful findings can be realized when focus is shifted to deviant-personal 
opportunistic behaviors. This specific literature stream suffers from somewhat of a 




conceptualizes opportunism at the firm-level only. Realizing this and exploring new 
theoretical perspectives can be useful to further unpacking the complexities of 
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 APPENDIX A: Study 1 and Study 2 Measures 
 




Study 1 Study 2 
Please indicate to what extend would you 
agree/disagree with the following statements 
about the two supply chain partners. 
Please indicate to what extend would you 
agree/disagree with the following statements 
about your alliance partner firm. 
This partner exaggerated needs to get what it 
desires. 
Our partner firm exaggerated needs to get what it 
desires. 
This partner was not always sincere. Our partner firm is not always sincere. 
This partner altered facts to get what it wanted. Senior management at the partner firm alters facts 
to get what it wants. 
This partner breached agreements to its benefit. Our partner firm breaches formal or informal 
agreements to its benefits.  
 
Deviant-Personal Opportunism 
Study 1 Study 2 
Please offer your perception of the two supply 
chain partners across the following dimensions: 
To what extend would you agree/disagree that 
certain individuals from the partner firm … 
People offered their best effort to make the 
relationship work (R) 
… withhold effort 
People responded in timely manner to our inquires 
(R) 
… responded in timely manner to our inquiries (R) 
People delivered on their promises (R) … do not deliver on their promises 
People provided truthful information to us (R) … provide false information 
People followed closely their verbal agreements 
with our firm (R) 
… breach agreements to benefit personally 
 
Monitoring 
Study 1 Study 2 
Please indicate the extent to which your firm 
monitored how good of partners the two supply 
chain partners were across the following areas. 
Please indicate the extent to which your firm 
monitors the alliance partner firm across the 
following aspects. 
Overall investment in the relationship Partner’s overall investment in the relationship 
Level of cooperation Partner’s level of cooperation 
Activities outside of our supply chain relationship Partner’s activities outside of the relationship 
Response speed when undergoing contract 
negotiations. 








Study 1 Study 2 
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree 
with the following statements about the two supply 
chain partners. 
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree 
with the following statements about your alliance 
partner firm. 
This partner kept promises it made to our firm The alliance partner firm keeps promises it makes 
to our firm 
This partner was not always honest with us (R) The alliance partner firm is not always honest with 
us (R) 
We believe the information this partner provided to 
us 
We believe the information that the alliance 
partner firm provided to us 
This partner was trustworthy This alliance partner firm is trustworthy 
This partner was genuinely concerned that our 
supply chain relationship succeeds 
This alliance partner firm is genuinely concerned 
that our alliance succeeds 
Our firm trusts that this partner kept our best 
interests in mind 
Our firm trusts that the alliance partner firm keeps 
our best interests in mind 
 
Relative Alliance Identity 
Study 1 Study 2 
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree 
with the following statements. 
Please complete the following statements by 
selecting the degree to which you personally 
identify with the alliance rather than with your firm, 
or vice versa. 
Seeing both our firm and [partner name] succeed 
would feel more satisfying than seeing only our 
firm succeed 
[my firm/the alliance]’s successes are my 
successes 
Attacks by other firms on [partner name] would 
feel like attacks on our own firm 
When someone criticizes the colleagues in [my 
firm/the alliance], it feels like a personal insult 
Someone praising our relationship with [partner 
name] would feel like a personal compliment 
When someone praises [my firm/the alliance], it 
feels like a personal compliment 
If I had to make a choice between doing what was 
best for my firm or for the supply chain relationship 
with [partner name], I would do what was best for 
the relationship 
If I had to make a choice between doing what was 
best for my firm or for the alliance, I would do what 
was best for [my firm/the alliance] 
When I talked with others about the relationship 
with [partner name], I usually would say “we” 
rather than “they” 
When I talk about the colleagues in [my firm/the 














Alliance Partner Stability: Partner Independence 
Study 1 Study 2 
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree 
with the following statements about the two supply 
chain partners.  
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree 
with the following statements about your alliance 
partner. 
This partner provided vital resources we would 
find difficult to obtain from other resellers (R) 
Our alliance partner provides vital resources we 
would find difficult to obtain elsewhere (R) 
It would have been difficult to replace this partner 
(R) 
It would be difficult to replace our alliance partner 
(R) 
Our strategic objectives would suffer greatly if we 
would have lost this partner (R) 
Our strategic objectives would suffer greatly if we 
would lose our alliance partner (R) 
 
 
Alliance Partner Stability: Organizational Proximity 
Study 1 Study 2 
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree 
with the following statements about your 
relationship with the two ranked supply chain 
partners. 
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree 
with the following statements about your alliance 
partner firm. 
The management style of [partner name] is very 
similar to the management style of our firm 
The management style of our alliance partner is 
very similar to the management style of our 
organization 
The business culture of [partner name] is very 
similar to ours 
The corporate culture of our alliance partner is 
very similar to ours 
The business practices of [partner name] are very 
similar to the business practices of our firm 
The business practices of our alliance partner are 




Alliance Performance: Financial Performance 
Study 1 Study 2 
Objective performance data were collected from 
the simulation. 
1) ROA 
2) Gross Profit  
For the following questions please consider your 
relationship with [partner name] during 2014. Rate 
the degree to which the alliance was effective at 
achieving the following outcomes relative to its 
original objectives 
Return on investment 













Alliance Performance: Strategic Performance 
Study 1 Study 2 
Not applicable, objective data were used. 
For the following questions please consider your 
relationship with [partner name] during 2014. 
Please indicate to what level you agree/disagree 
with the following statements about the alliance. 
During the last year, the collaboration provided a 
great opportunity to learn from our partner firm 
Collaborating with this alliance partner firm during 
the last year was a wise business decision 
Our strategic objectives set for this alliance for the 










































APPENDIX C.1: Introductory Email to Contacts 
 
 
Dear [FIRST NAME], 
I am a PhD student in marketing at the University of Tennessee. I am currently working on my 
dissertation. My dissertation would greatly benefit from your professional expertise.  It would be 
very helpful if you could spare 10 to 15 minutes of your time to answer my dissertation survey.  
Completing the survey will ... 
1)      … allow me to prepare and share my dissertation findings report with you.  
2)      … raise $20.00 towards a donation to St. Jude Children’s Hospital.  
3)      … get me closer to finishing my dissertation. 
The goal of this survey, and overall my dissertation, is to contribute to existing knowledge 
regarding B2B relationships.  
Your company and your contact information was obtained from SDC Platinum database, which 
is available to PhD students through the University of Tennessee. This database compiles a list of 
B2B partnerships and strategic alliances.  
Can I send you a link to my survey? 
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me.  
THANK YOU! 
Best regards, 
Anton P. Fenik 
Marketing Ph.D. Candidate 
Marketing and Supply Chain Management 
The Haslam College of Business Administration 






















APPENDIX C.2: 1st and 2nd Follow-up Emails to Contacts 
 
 
Dear [FIRST NAME], 
This is my last request for your participation in my dissertation survey.  Only 20 more responses 
are needed! In return you will receive: 
1) A report with my dissertation findings, and 
2) I will add $20 towards a donation to St. Jude Children’s Hospital in your name. I am 
approaching the $3,500 goal … your response can get me there.  
 
12 minutes of your time can translate into a lot of good!  
1) You get the report with potentially insightful findings that may be useful to your 
business. 
2) We will help medical research at St. Jude’s Children’s Hospital. 
3) I will get to finish my dissertation through which I can become a more valuable resource 
to the business community.  
 
Can I send you a link to my survey, please? 
Thank you! 
Best regards, 
Anton P. Fenik 
Marketing Ph.D. Candidate 
Marketing and Supply Chain Management 
The Haslam College of Business Administration 
University of Tennessee 
afenik@utk.edu; 803-629-5132 
 
More background about me: 
I am a PhD student in marketing at the University of Tennessee. I am currently working on my 
dissertation. Part of my dissertation requires that I collect data from business practitioners like 
yourself. Hence, me contacting you regarding participation in my survey. Here is a link to my 
University of Tennessee profile: 
http://mscm.bus.utk.edu/Students/Current-PhD-Students/Fenik.asp 
The goal of this survey, and overall my dissertation, is to contribute to existing knowledge 
regarding B2B relationships.  
Your company and your contact information was obtained from SDC Platinum database, which 
is available to PhD students through the University of Tennessee. This database compiles a list of 









APPENDIX C.3: Survey Link & Reminders to Opted-In Participants 
 
Email with the survey link after contacts agreed to participate 
 
Dear [FIRST NAME], 
 
Thank you for your reply and willingness to participate.  
 
A link to my Qualtrics survey is below. The link is auto-generated by Qualtrics, which 
guarantees anonymity of your response. 
 







Reminder email to contacts who already agreed to participate but failed to complete the 
survey after the initial email with the survey link above. 
 
Dear [FIRST NAME], 
 
Thank you again for your willingness to help with my dissertation. This is just a friendly 
reminder to complete my survey. For your convenience, you can find a link to my survey 
below. 
 
[UNIQUE SURVEY LINK HERE] 
 
I am missing only around 15 responses to meet the sample size necessary for my 
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